India's roughly 17 crore (170 million) Muslims, or 14.2% of the population (Census 2011), trail the all-India average on 11 of the 17 indicators that allow a direct comparison, widest on muslims in the Lok Sabha, state MLA Muslim share, and Muslim incarceration rate. They run ahead on a handful (toilet access, clean water at home, and infant mortality rate).
Each card sets the latest Muslim figure beside Hindu and all-India baselines, drawn from 25 primary government sources. OpenTap any card for its chart, method and source. How these are measured →
India's largest religious minority, more urban than the national average and concentrated in a handful of districts in the north and east.
How much of India's population is Muslim, by the latest census.
Muslims were 14.2% of India's population at the 2011 Census, about one in seven Indians and roughly 17 crore people. That count is now well over a decade old: the Pew Research Center estimated the Muslim share had reached about 15% by 2020 ↗ Pew Research Center, 2021. It is still rising, but slowly, and not because growth is speeding up: Muslim fertility has fallen sharply, steadily narrowing the gap with other communities ↗ Pew Research Center, 2021.
The chart tracks the Muslim share of the population across the six censuses from 1961 to 2011, the last year with hard census data. The next count, Census 2027, is long delayed from the one due in 2021: its population-enumeration phase is set for early 2027, and it will be India's first digital and first caste-counted census since 1931, so a fresh official figure is still some way off ↗ Census 2027 announcement, PIB. The tabs open the detail: By state and By district show how unevenly Muslims are spread, Urban vs rural and By age show a younger, more urban profile, and Population growth shows how the decadal growth rate has fallen.
Population share is the denominator for everything else on this dashboard: it is what every gap on jobs, schooling or representation is measured against. A seventh of the country is large enough that how this group fares shapes India's own development.
Definition. Muslim population as a share of total population at the given geography level.
Methodology. Population shares from the primary RGI Census religion volumes, 1961 to 2011. Two all-India figures exclude a state where the Census could not be held: 1981 excludes Assam and 1991 excludes Jammu & Kashmir. The 2021 Census is delayed.
Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: pop-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Muslim |
|---|---|
| Mizoram | |
| Sikkim | |
| Punjab | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | |
| Chhattisgarh | |
| Odisha | |
| Himachal Pradesh | |
| Nagaland | |
| Dadra & Nagar Haveli | |
| Meghalaya | |
| Chandigarh | |
| Tamil Nadu | |
| Puducherry | |
| Madhya Pradesh | |
| Haryana | |
| Daman & Diu | |
| Goa | |
| Manipur | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | |
| Tripura | |
| Rajasthan | |
| Andhra Pradesh | |
| Gujarat | |
| Maharashtra | |
| Telangana | |
| NCT of Delhi | |
| Karnataka | |
| Uttarakhand | |
| Jharkhand | |
| Bihar | |
| Uttar Pradesh | |
| Kerala | |
| West Bengal | |
| Assam | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | |
| Lakshadweep |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
India had 640 districts in 2011, yet the 100 most Muslim-populous, just 15.6% of them, are home to 58.6% of all Indian Muslims, and the top 10 alone hold 14.0%. This is a geographic-concentration measure, not a community comparison.
| # | District (ST) | Muslims | % of district |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Murshidabad (WB) | 4.71M | 66.3% |
| 2 | South Twenty Four Parganas (WB) | 2.90M | 35.6% |
| 3 | Malappuram (KL) | 2.89M | 70.2% |
| 4 | North Twenty Four Parganas (WB) | 2.58M | 25.8% |
| 5 | Moradabad (UP) | 2.25M | 47.1% |
| 6 | Maldah (WB) | 2.05M | 51.3% |
| 7 | Mumbai Suburban (MH) | 1.80M | 19.2% |
| 8 | Hyderabad (AP) | 1.71M | 43.5% |
| 9 | Muzaffarnagar (UP) | 1.71M | 41.3% |
| 10 | Barddhaman (WB) | 1.60M | 20.7% |
| 11 | Bijnor (UP) | 1.59M | 43.0% |
| 12 | Nagaon (AS) | 1.56M | 55.4% |
| 13 | Dhubri (AS) | 1.55M | 79.7% |
| 14 | Bareilly (UP) | 1.54M | 34.5% |
| 15 | Uttar Dinajpur (WB) | 1.50M | 49.9% |
| 16 | Saharanpur (UP) | 1.45M | 42.0% |
| 17 | Nadia (WB) | 1.38M | 26.8% |
| 18 | Katihar (BR) | 1.37M | 44.5% |
| 19 | Thane (MH) | 1.36M | 12.3% |
| 20 | Birbhum (WB) | 1.30M | 37.1% |
| 21 | Haora (WB) | 1.27M | 26.2% |
| 22 | Purnia (BR) | 1.26M | 38.5% |
| 23 | Bangalore (KA) | 1.25M | 13.0% |
| 24 | Kozhikode (KL) | 1.21M | 39.2% |
| 25 | Araria (BR) | 1.21M | 43.0% |
| 26 | Barpeta (AS) | 1.20M | 70.7% |
| 27 | Ghaziabad (UP) | 1.19M | 25.4% |
| 28 | Meerut (UP) | 1.19M | 34.4% |
| 29 | Rampur (UP) | 1.18M | 50.6% |
| 30 | Srinagar (JK) | 1.18M | 95.2% |
| 31 | Bahraich (UP) | 1.17M | 33.5% |
| 32 | Kishanganj (BR) | 1.15M | 68.0% |
| 33 | Anantnag (JK) | 1.06M | 98.0% |
| 34 | Purba Champaran (BR) | 990k | 19.4% |
| 35 | Lucknow (UP) | 985k | 21.5% |
| 36 | Baramula (JK) | 959k | 95.2% |
| 37 | Kolkata (WB) | 926k | 20.6% |
| 38 | Sitapur (UP) | 894k | 19.9% |
| 39 | Ahmadabad (GJ) | 883k | 12.2% |
| 40 | Darbhanga (BR) | 881k | 22.4% |
| 41 | Hugli (WB) | 870k | 15.8% |
| 42 | Pashchim Champaran (BR) | 865k | 22.0% |
| 43 | Mewat (HR) | 863k | 79.2% |
| 44 | Kupwara (JK) | 823k | 94.6% |
| 45 | Madhubani (BR) | 819k | 18.3% |
| 46 | Palakkad (KL) | 813k | 28.9% |
| 47 | Kheri (UP) | 808k | 20.1% |
| 48 | Balrampur (UP) | 806k | 37.5% |
| 49 | Allahabad (UP) | 797k | 13.4% |
| 50 | Budaun (UP) | 791k | 21.5% |
| 51 | Aurangabad (MH) | 787k | 21.3% |
| 52 | Bulandshahr (UP) | 777k | 22.2% |
| 53 | Mumbai (MH) | 773k | 25.1% |
| 54 | Jyotiba Phule Nagar (UP) | 750k | 40.8% |
| 55 | Siddharthnagar (UP) | 748k | 29.2% |
| 56 | Muzaffarpur (BR) | 746k | 15.5% |
| 57 | Purba Medinipur (WB) | 743k | 14.6% |
| 58 | Kannur (KL) | 742k | 29.4% |
| 59 | Sitamarhi (BR) | 740k | 21.6% |
| 60 | Bara Banki (UP) | 737k | 22.6% |
| 61 | Badgam (JK) | 736k | 97.7% |
| 62 | Aligarh (UP) | 729k | 19.9% |
| 63 | Kanpur Nagar (UP) | 721k | 15.7% |
| 64 | Koch Bihar (WB) | 720k | 25.5% |
| 65 | Azamgarh (UP) | 719k | 15.6% |
| 66 | Nashik (MH) | 693k | 11.4% |
| 67 | Karimganj (AS) | 692k | 56.4% |
| 68 | Jaipur (RJ) | 687k | 10.4% |
| 69 | Gonda (UP) | 679k | 19.8% |
| 70 | Pune (MH) | 674k | 7.1% |
| 71 | Kurnool (AP) | 671k | 16.6% |
| 72 | Surat (GJ) | 661k | 10.9% |
| 73 | North East (DL) | 658k | 29.3% |
| 74 | Cachar (AS) | 655k | 37.7% |
| 75 | Sultanpur (UP) | 650k | 17.1% |
| 76 | Hardwar (UK) | 648k | 34.3% |
| 77 | Paschim Medinipur (WB) | 621k | 10.5% |
| 78 | Kushinagar (UP) | 620k | 17.4% |
| 79 | Rangareddy (AP) | 618k | 11.7% |
| 80 | Siwan (BR) | 608k | 18.3% |
| 81 | Kamrup (AS) | 602k | 39.7% |
| 82 | Darrang (AS) | 597k | 64.3% |
| 83 | Goalpara (AS) | 580k | 57.5% |
| 84 | Jalgaon (MH) | 560k | 13.3% |
| 85 | Guntur (AP) | 560k | 11.5% |
| 86 | Hardoi (UP) | 556k | 13.6% |
| 87 | Alwar (RJ) | 547k | 14.9% |
| 88 | Varanasi (UP) | 547k | 14.9% |
| 89 | Bhagalpur (BR) | 537k | 17.7% |
| 90 | Pulwama (JK) | 535k | 95.5% |
| 91 | Thrissur (KL) | 533k | 17.1% |
| 92 | Belgaum (KA) | 528k | 11.1% |
| 93 | Shahjahanpur (UP) | 528k | 17.6% |
| 94 | Bhopal (MP) | 525k | 22.2% |
| 95 | Ernakulam (KL) | 514k | 15.7% |
| 96 | Gulbarga (KA) | 513k | 20.0% |
| 97 | Giridih (JH) | 509k | 20.8% |
| 98 | Kollam (KL) | 508k | 19.3% |
| 99 | Morigaon (AS) | 503k | 52.6% |
| 100 | Dakshina Kannada (KA) | 502k | 24.0% |
All 640 districts: download CSV
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 18.2% | 12.4% |
| Jain | 0.9% | 0.1% |
| Buddhist | 1.0% | 0.6% |
| Sikh | 1.6% | 1.8% |
| Christian | 3.0% | 2.0% |
| Hindu | 74.8% | 82.1% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Each line is a community's own age profile, the share of its members in each 10-year band, so communities of very different sizes compare directly. Muslims have the youngest profile: 23.8% are under 10 against 19.3% of Hindus and 13.0% of Jains. Jains, Sikhs and Christians skew oldest.
| Age cohort | Muslim | Hindu | Christian | Sikh | Buddhist | Jain |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0-9 | 23.8% | 19.3% | 17.6% | 15.4% | 16.9% | 13.0% |
| 10-19 | 23.5% | 20.6% | 19.2% | 19.3% | 19.8% | 15.7% |
| 20-29 | 17.8% | 17.5% | 17.1% | 18.4% | 19.3% | 17.2% |
| 30-39 | 13.0% | 14.6% | 14.6% | 14.5% | 15.2% | 16.0% |
| 40-49 | 9.4% | 11.4% | 12.6% | 12.4% | 11.6% | 14.3% |
| 50-59 | 5.7% | 7.5% | 9.0% | 8.3% | 7.6% | 10.9% |
| 60-69 | 4.1% | 5.5% | 5.8% | 6.8% | 5.8% | 7.2% |
| 70-79 | 1.7% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 3.1% | 2.7% | 3.7% |
| 80+ | 0.7% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.6% | 0.9% | 1.5% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Between 2001 and 2011 the Muslim population grew 24.6%, faster than Hindu (16.8%) and the all-India 17.7%. The gap reflects higher, now converging, fertility, not migration or conversion.
| Community | 2001 | 2011 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 13,81,88,240 | 17,22,45,158 | 24.6% |
| Hindu | 82,75,78,868 | 96,62,57,353 | 16.8% |
| Christian | 2,40,80,016 | 2,78,19,588 | 15.5% |
| Sikh | 1,92,15,730 | 2,08,33,116 | 8.4% |
| Buddhist | 79,55,207 | 84,42,972 | 6.1% |
| Jain | 42,25,053 | 44,51,753 | 5.4% |
| All | 1,02,86,10,328 | 1,21,08,54,977 | 17.7% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
What share of each community lives in towns and cities rather than villages.
Two in five Muslims, 39.9%, lived in towns and cities in 2011, well above the 31% national average and the 29% for Hindus. Muslims are one of India's most urban communities, a fact that shapes much of the rest of this dashboard, from their better housing amenities to their concentration in urban informal work.
The chart compares how urban each community is across the 2001 and 2011 censuses; this is a descriptive fact, not a good or bad outcome. The By state tab shows how much it varies, from highly urban Muslim populations in the south and west to more rural ones in the east.
Whether a community lives in towns or villages colours almost every other measure: urban families have better access to toilets, water and hospitals, but also face the insecure, informal labour markets and segregated neighbourhoods of the city. Muslim urban concentration is the thread running through both their amenity advantages and their job disadvantages.
Contextgap widening
Muslim 39.9% vs Hindu 29.2% in 2011, 10.7pp higher. Muslims have been markedly more urban than Hindus in every recent census, a structural fact that helps explain the housing-amenity inversion elsewhere on this dashboard.
Definition. Percentage of each community living in urban areas. Census Table C-01 provides religion × residence (rural/urban) × sex breakdowns at national, state, district, and town levels; series covers Census 2001 and 2011.
Methodology. Urban share = urban_persons / total_persons * 100, per Census C-01. Two-census series (2001 and 2011) at national and state level; the 2021 Census is delayed. Muslims (~40%) and Christians (~40%) are markedly more urbanised than the all-India average (~31%), a Sachar-era fact that conditions outcomes downstream (urban-poor labour markets, segregation, housing access).
Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: urban-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Muslim | Hindu |
|---|---|---|
| Assam | 18.2% | |
| Meghalaya | 44.4% | |
| Bihar | 10.8% | |
| Himachal Pradesh | 9.5% | |
| Tripura | 29.2% | |
| Haryana | 36.3% | |
| West Bengal | 35.8% | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 29.5% | |
| Jharkhand | 26.4% | |
| Manipur | 45.5% | |
| Uttar Pradesh | 18.4% | |
| Uttarakhand | 27.9% | |
| Odisha | 16.2% | |
| Punjab | 58.8% | |
| Rajasthan | 21.9% | |
| Kerala | 48.5% | |
| Nagaland | 63.6% | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | 40.5% | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 36.1% | |
| Mizoram | 76.1% | |
| Sikkim | 26.8% | |
| Karnataka | 33.9% | |
| Madhya Pradesh | 24.5% | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 29.4% | |
| Gujarat | 39.5% | |
| Chhattisgarh | 22.1% | |
| Maharashtra | 39.8% | |
| Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 45.4% | |
| Tamil Nadu | 45.3% | |
| Lakshadweep | 81.9% | |
| Puducherry | 66.0% | |
| Goa | 59.1% | |
| Daman & Diu | 73.9% | |
| Chandigarh | 97.3% | |
| NCT of Delhi | 97.2% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Higher means more women relative to men; a low value signals a gender imbalance favouring males.
higher is better
There were 951 Muslim women for every 1,000 Muslim men in 2011, a little higher than the 939 for Hindus and the 943 national average. Like the rest of India the Muslim population has fewer women than men, but its ratio has been slightly more balanced than the Hindu one and has improved since 2001.
The chart tracks the number of females per 1,000 males across six censuses since 1961; a value below 1,000 means fewer women than men. Because the interesting range is narrow, the axis sits in an 800 to 1,050 band rather than starting at zero. The By state and Urban vs rural tabs show where the ratio is most and least balanced.
The sex ratio is a quiet signal of how a society values its girls and women, picking up the combined effect of sex selection, female mortality and migration. A ratio closer to balance is generally the healthier sign.
Aheadgap widening
Muslim 951 vs Hindu 939 in 2011, 12 ahead. The Muslim sex ratio has run slightly more balanced than the Hindu one across recent censuses and improved between 2001 and 2011, against the wider Indian pattern of too few women.
Definition. Number of females per 1000 males in the population. A value below 1000 means fewer women than men. Census series across six censuses, 1961-2011.
Methodology. Females / males * 1000 from Census religion tables across six censuses (1961-2011): 1961 Social & Cultural Tables C-VII, the 1971 and 1981 census religion papers, 1991 C-09, 2001 C-01 and 2011 C-15. National for all six years; state-level for 2001 and 2011. Two all-India figures exclude a state where the Census could not be held: 1981 excludes Assam and 1991 excludes Jammu & Kashmir.
The 2021 Census is delayed.
Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: sex-ratio.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Muslim | Hindu |
|---|---|---|
| Sikkim | 856 | |
| Mizoram | 506 | |
| Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 774 | |
| Daman & Diu | 607 | |
| Nagaland | 651 | |
| Chandigarh | 803 | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 785 | |
| NCT of Delhi | 865 | |
| Himachal Pradesh | 975 | |
| Punjab | 879 | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | 858 | |
| Haryana | 876 | |
| Uttarakhand | 976 | |
| Goa | 929 | |
| Maharashtra | 928 | |
| Meghalaya | 863 | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 795 | |
| Uttar Pradesh | 907 | |
| Bihar | 913 | |
| Jharkhand | 935 | |
| Gujarat | 916 | |
| Madhya Pradesh | 929 | |
| Rajasthan | 927 | |
| West Bengal | 948 | |
| Chhattisgarh | 990 | |
| Assam | 958 | |
| Odisha | 977 | |
| Tripura | 959 | |
| Karnataka | 972 | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 993 | |
| Manipur | 982 | |
| Lakshadweep | 115 | |
| Tamil Nadu | 992 | |
| Puducherry | 1030 | |
| Kerala | 1077 |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 942 | 958 |
| Sikh | 898 | 905 |
| Jain | 959 | 935 |
| Hindu | 921 | 947 |
| Buddhist | 973 | 960 |
| Christian | 1046 | 1008 |
| Other | 1007 | 1009 |
| All communities | 929 | 949 |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Lower infant mortality and the lowest anaemia of any community, but the highest under-5 stunting; basic amenities (toilets, water, electricity, pucca homes) at or above par.
Of recent live births, what share took place at a hospital or health facility rather than at home.
higher is better
Muslim institutional deliveries have surged from under a third of births in 1998 to 84.3% in 2019-21, one of the fastest gains on the dashboard. Hindus are at 89.5% and the national average 88.6%, so a gap remains, but most Muslim births now happen in a hospital or clinic rather than at home.
The chart tracks the share of births in a health facility for each community across four National Family Health Surveys from 1998 to 2019-21; rising is better, and every line climbs steeply. The distance between Muslims and the better-served communities is the point, so the vertical axis does not start at zero.
A trained attendant and emergency care at birth are the single biggest protection against a mother or newborn dying. The shift from home to facility birth is the main reason maternal and newborn deaths have fallen so fast.
Behindgap widening
Muslim 84.3% vs Hindu 89.5% in 2020, 5.2pp behind. The gap with Hindus widened during the mid-2000s, as better-off communities scaled up first, then began closing again after 2015 as cash incentives like Janani Suraksha Yojana reached further.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Percentage of live births in the years preceding each survey round that took place in a health facility (public or private), among women age 15-49.
Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 8.13 (page 324); the "all" value is a sample-size-weighted average of the 7 religion rates (the published Total row was hard to extract cleanly from the dual-column PDF layout) and matches NFHS-5's published 88.6% within rounding. Earlier rounds come from each report's facility-delivery religion table; every canonical row's methodology_note records its exact source.
Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99). Download CSV: inst-delivery.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Of every 1,000 babies born, how many die before their first birthday.
lower is better
Muslims have lower infant mortality than Hindus, and have done so in every national survey since the 1990s, despite being poorer on most other measures. In the latest survey, 2019-21, about 33 Muslim infants died before their first birthday for every 1,000 born, against 35 among Hindus. This Muslim survival advantage is real but shrinking, as mortality has fallen faster among other communities.
The main chart tracks infant deaths per 1,000 live births for each community across four National Family Health Surveys from 1998 to 2019-21; here a falling line is good news, since lower is better. Every community's line drops steeply, so the chart shows both the broad decline and the narrowing distance between communities. The Urban vs rural tab splits each rate into town and village, where most infant deaths still happen, and shows the Muslim advantage is largely a rural one.
Infant mortality is one of the most sensitive measures of a population's living conditions, capturing the combined effect of nutrition, sanitation, maternal health and access to care in the first, most fragile year of life. That Muslims do better here than richer communities is one of the most studied puzzles in Indian demography, and a reminder that income alone does not determine survival.
Aheadgap narrowing
Muslim 33.0 vs Hindu 35.4 in 2020, 2.4 ahead. Muslims have recorded lower infant mortality than Hindus in every survey since 1998, but the advantage has shrunk from roughly 18 points then to about 2 today as mortality fell faster among other communities.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Probability of dying before the first birthday, expressed per 1000 live births, for the period preceding each survey round.
Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 7.2 publishes URBAN and RURAL IMR by religion separately with no total-residence-by-religion column, so the national total is a population-weighted average using Census 2011 urban/rural population by religion as weights (<1% drift; urban/rural shares by religion are stable). Earlier rounds come from each report's religion table; every canonical row's methodology_note records its exact source.
Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99) · Census 2011 · C-series. Download CSV: imr.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 27.8 | 36.5 |
| Buddhist | 16.2 | 24.6 |
| Other | 21.9 | 31.5 |
| Sikh | 19.6 | 31.9 |
| Christian | 12.6 | 33.7 |
| Hindu | 26.9 | 38.9 |
| All communities | 26.6 | 38.4 |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Of children under 5, what share is too short for their age, a long-term sign of chronic undernutrition.
lower is better
In 2019-21, 36.8% of Muslim children under five were stunted, too short for their age from chronic undernutrition, just above Hindus at 35.5% and the national 35.5%. It is a striking counterpoint to infant mortality, where Muslim children do better: they are more likely to survive infancy, yet slightly more likely to grow up stunted.
The chart compares the share of under-five children who are stunted across communities for 2019-21, the latest National Family Health Survey; here lower is better. Stunting builds up over the whole of early childhood rather than at a single moment, so it shifts slowly.
Stunting in the first years is largely irreversible and predicts weaker school performance, lower adult earnings and poorer health for life. It is one of the clearest early signs of how poverty passes to the next generation.
Behind
Muslim 36.8% vs Hindu 35.5% in 2020, 1.3pp behind. The Muslim figure sits just above the Hindu one, but both are far above the levels seen for Christian, Sikh and Jain children, a sign that this is a poverty gap more than a community one.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Percentage of children under age 5 classified as stunted (height-for-age more than 2 SD below the WHO Child Growth Standards median). Stunting indicates chronic malnutrition in early life.
Methodology. NFHS-5 (2019-21) Table 10.1 (Nutritional status of children by background characteristics). Religion column = % below -2 SD HFA; all-India value is the sample-size-weighted average of the 6 religion rows (reproduces the published national rate of 35.5%). Single round in canonical for now; NFHS-2/3/4 extension possible (same pattern as IMR / inst-delivery / anaemia trend extractors).
Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21). Download CSV: stunting-u5.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Of women in childbearing age (15 to 49), what share has anaemia (low haemoglobin).
lower is better
More than half of Muslim women aged 15 to 49, 55.6%, were anaemic in 2019-21, marginally better than Hindu women at 57.4% and the national 57.0%. The small Muslim edge is real and long-standing, but the headline is grim for everyone: anaemia is extremely common across all communities and has risen since the last survey.
The chart tracks the share of women who are anaemic across four National Family Health Surveys; lower is better, but notice how little the lines separate and how most tick upward after 2015. The Muslim line sits just below the Hindu one throughout.
Anaemia saps energy and learning, raises the risk of death in childbirth, and passes low iron to the next child. At over half of all women, it is one of India's largest and most stubborn public-health failures.
Aheadgap narrowing
Muslim 55.6% vs Hindu 57.4% in 2020, 1.8pp ahead. The Muslim advantage is small and, like every community's, moving the wrong way: anaemia rose between 2015 and 2019-21 despite a national supplementation programme.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Percentage of women age 15-49 with any anaemia, defined as haemoglobin <12.0 g/dl (non-pregnant) or <11.0 g/dl (pregnant), altitude-adjusted.
Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 10.23.1 reports total-residence women's anaemia by religion directly. NFHS changed anaemia measurement between NFHS-4 and NFHS-5 (capillary vs venous blood at the same Hb <12.0 g/dl cut-off), which breaks cross-round comparability, so the three pre-NFHS-5 rounds carry break_flag=true: do not read the 2015 -> 2020 step as a pure trend.
Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99). Download CSV: women-anemia.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
What a household pays from its own pocket for one hospital admission, after any insurance or employer reimbursement: doctor's fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges. Childbirth stays are excluded. Muslim hospital stays cost less on average, for two reasons: more Muslim patients use government hospitals, where a stay costs a fraction of what a private hospital charges, and Muslim households have less to spend on private care. Spending less does not mean getting the same care for less money.
When a Muslim household has someone admitted to hospital, it pays about INR 30,104 from its own pocket, against INR 34,323 in a Hindu household. A lower bill is not good news here: it mostly reflects greater reliance on cheaper government hospitals, which in turn tracks lower incomes, rather than cheaper or better care.
The chart compares out-of-pocket spending per hospital admission across communities for 2017 and 2025; childbirth is excluded, and lower is not automatically better. The Urban vs rural tab shows costs are higher in towns, where private hospitals dominate.
A single hospital admission is one of the commonest ways an Indian family slides into debt or poverty. What a household pays, and whether it can lean on a public hospital, says a lot about both its income and its exposure to a medical shock.
Contextgap widening
Muslim INR 30,104 vs Hindu INR 34,323 in 2025, INR 4,219 lower. The gap has widened in rupee terms as all costs rose, consistent with Muslim households staying more dependent on the public system as private care grew dearer.
Definition. What a household pays from its own pocket for one hospital admission, after any insurance or employer reimbursement: doctor's fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges. Childbirth stays are excluded. A lower figure does not mean cheaper care: it mostly shows who uses government hospitals and who can afford private ones.
Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of two NSS Household Social Consumption: Health rounds: the 75th (Sch 25.0, July 2017 - June 2018, 1.14 lakh households, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes) and the 80th (January - December 2025, 1.40 lakh households, via the NADA CSV distribution). Out-of-pocket medical expenditure per hospitalisation case excluding childbirth is the 2025 release's own headline construct, computed identically in both rounds: medical expenditure (fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges; transport and food excluded) minus any insurance or employer reimbursement, averaged over cases of the last 365 days. The 2017-18 estimator reproduces all nine published cells of NSS Report 586 Statement 3.15 within 0.01% and the published reimbursement shares exactly; the 2025 estimator reproduces all six press-note OOPME cells within 0.01%.
Neither publication breaks expenditure down by religion. A Muslim hospital stay cost INR 30,104 against the all-India INR 34,064 in 2025 (Hindu INR 34,323), and INR 14,827 against 18,088 in 2017-18: about 12-19% less per stay. Muslims lean more on government hospitals (41.5% of Muslim hospitalisation cases in 2025 against 36.4% of Hindu cases, down from 47.6% and 41.8% in 2017-18), where the average bill runs about an eighth of a private one, and lower spending capacity does the rest; the survey cannot tell cheaper care apart from care that was needed but never bought.
Values are nominal rupees of each round; health insurance coverage roughly tripled between the rounds, so the netted reimbursement matters more in 2025. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, not religions, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates.
Where this data comes from. NSS Health 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.0 Health (2017-18). Download CSV: hospital-oop-spend.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | INR 31,423 | INR 29,189 |
| Hindu | INR 39,468 | INR 31,588 |
| Christian | INR 45,115 | INR 34,281 |
| Sikh | INR 37,408 | INR 40,004 |
| All communities | INR 38,688 | INR 31,484 |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS Health 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.0 Health (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
What share of households has a toilet of any type.
higher is better
Nine in ten Muslim households had a toilet in 2020, at 90.3%, almost ten points above Hindus at 80.7%. This is one of a cluster of housing measures, toilets, water and electricity, where Muslims sit at or above the national level, a pattern that runs against the gaps on income and education.
The chart compares the share of households with a toilet across communities for 2019-21; higher is better. The Urban vs rural tab matters here: access is higher in towns for every community, and part of the Muslim lead comes from being a more urban community.
A household toilet is one of the strongest protections a child has: where neighbourhoods stop open defecation, fewer infants die and fewer children are stunted. This is the same sanitation advantage that helps explain why Muslim infants survive at higher rates.
Ahead
Muslim 90.3% vs Hindu 80.7% in 2020, 9.6pp ahead. The Muslim lead on toilets holds across the country and connects directly to the community's better infant survival, where local sanitation is the best-evidenced cause.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Share of households with access to a toilet of any type.
Methodology. NFHS-5 Table 2.4 (page 74). Total residence, national. Year=2020 = NFHS-5 fieldwork midpoint.
Muslim toilet access (90.3%) runs *above* Hindu (80.7%), partly because urban-Muslim share is higher than urban-Hindu share, and urban access is uniformly higher. Not strictly "improved sanitation" per the WHO/UNICEF JMP definition: the published NFHS-5 table aggregates flush, pit and other toilet types.
Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21). Download CSV: improved-sanitation.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 97.2% | 85.4% |
| Other | 95.5% | 66.2% |
| Hindu | 95.1% | 74.0% |
| Buddhist | 95.3% | 82.8% |
| Christian | 97.5% | 87.2% |
| Jain | 99.9% | 88.1% |
| Sikh | 99.3% | 96.7% |
| All communities | 95.6% | 76.0% |
Read Reproduce this view. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Source: NFHS-5 (2019-21). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
What share of households gets its drinking water from an improved source located within its own premises, so nobody has to fetch water from outside. Muslim households are ahead of Hindu households here, driven by a rural advantage.
higher is better
About 69% of Muslim households had drinking water on their own premises in 2018, so no one had to walk to fetch it, against 63% of Hindu households. Like toilets, this is a measure where Muslims sit a little above the national level, helped by being a more urban community.
The chart compares the share of households with an improved water source on their own premises across communities for 2018; higher is better, because it means no daily walk to fetch water. The Urban vs rural tab splits the two.
Water on the premises saves hours of fetching, almost always women's and girls' time, and cuts the contamination that comes with carrying and storing water. It feeds straight into health, school attendance and the time women have for paid work.
Ahead
Muslim 69.3% vs Hindu 62.5% in 2018, 6.8pp ahead. The Muslim edge on water, like sanitation, owes much to urban concentration, and it sits within a wider picture where the basic-amenities story runs opposite to the income story.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Share of households whose main source of drinking water is an improved source (piped, tubewell, protected well, bottled and similar) located within the household's own premises, so no one has to fetch water from outside.
Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of NSS 76th round Schedule 1.2 (Drinking Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Housing Condition, Jul-Dec 2018; 1.07 lakh households): improved principal source located within premises, by religion of household head, weighted. Report 584 publishes this by state and social group, never religion. The extraction reproduces the published all-India values across 24 validation cells to a worst gap of 0.24 points (improved-within-premises all-India: 63.6 computed vs 63.8 published, the strictest blank-distance treatment).
Muslim households are AHEAD of Hindu households here (69.3% vs 62.5%), driven by a rural advantage (65.9 vs 54.3); urban Muslims trail urban Hindus on piped-into-dwelling water (36.5% vs 41.4%, in the data file). Unit data: the original mospi.gov.in TXT distribution (the current NADA catalog ships only a proprietary binary; re-fetch URLs + sha256 in sources/nss76/). NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported; the split is indicative; no sub-state estimates.
Year=2018 = survey period.
Where this data comes from. NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Download CSV: improved-water-premises.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 74.6% | 65.9% |
| Christian | 70.0% | 40.5% |
| Hindu | 79.0% | 54.3% |
| Sikh | 93.6% | 89.5% |
| All communities | 78.4% | 55.9% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.
What share of households lives in a pucca house, with walls and roof of permanent materials like brick, concrete or stone. The standard Indian measure of housing quality.
higher is better
About 84% of Muslim households lived in a pucca, permanent-material home in 2018, essentially the same as Hindus at 83%. On the basic quality of the roof over their heads the two communities are level, another amenity where the usual gap does not appear.
The chart compares the share of households in a pucca (permanent-material) home across communities for 2018; higher is better. The Electricity tab carries a closely related amenity, and Urban vs rural splits the rate by place, where pucca housing is near-universal in towns.
A pucca home of brick or concrete withstands monsoon, heat and fire far better than a kutcha one of mud or thatch, and is the base for everything from health to a child's place to study. It is the most basic marker of housing security.
At parity
Muslim 83.6% vs Hindu 83.3% in 2018, about level. On housing structure Muslims and Hindus are level, and both sit near the national average; the gaps in this cluster are between town and village, not between communities.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Share of households living in a pucca structure: walls and roof both made of permanent materials (brick, concrete, stone, metal and similar), the standard Indian measure of housing quality.
Methodology. Computed from NSS 76th round Schedule 1.2 unit-level microdata (Jul-Dec 2018), by religion of household head, weighted; reproduces the published all-India values (76.7 rural / 96.0 urban / 83.3 all) exactly. Muslim 83.6% vs Hindu 83.3%: parity overall, with rural Muslims slightly behind rural Hindus (75.9 vs 76.8) offset by the community's higher urban share. Same source, validation and caveats as the water card (see sources/nss76/); religion is self-reported per the NSO rider; year=2018 = survey period.
The "Electricity" tab folds in the companion measure from the same Schedule 1.2 microdata (the decarded household-electricity metric, reproducing the published 93.9 rural / 99.1 urban / 95.7 all exactly): Muslim 96.6% vs Hindu 95.4%, near-parity by 2018 with the small Muslim edge from the community's higher urban share.
Where this data comes from. NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Download CSV: pucca-house.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Share of households with electricity for domestic use, from the same NSS 76th round survey as the pucca-housing chart. Near-universal by 2018 and close to parity: Muslim households at 96.6% against Hindu 95.4% and all-India 95.7%, the small Muslim edge riding on the community's higher urban share.
| Community | Overall | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 96.6% | 98.8% | 95.2% |
| Sikh | 99.7% | 100.0% | 99.6% |
| Christian | 97.5% | 99.2% | 96.5% |
| Hindu | 95.4% | 99.2% | 93.6% |
| All communities | 95.7% | 99.1% | 93.9% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 95.7% | 75.9% |
| Christian | 92.6% | 71.1% |
| Hindu | 96.2% | 76.8% |
| Sikh | 99.4% | 96.0% |
| All communities | 96.0% | 76.7% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.
Behind on literacy, higher education, salaried jobs, pay and household wealth; workforce participation near par, with the gap widest in cities.
Of people aged 7 and older, what share can read and write. The Census uses 7+ as the standard cutoff to exclude very young children.
higher is better
Just under 69% of Muslims aged 7 and above could read and write in 2011, the lowest literacy rate among India's larger religious communities and about five points behind Hindus. The gap has been narrowing slowly since 2001, but literacy stays lowest for Muslim women and in rural areas, where barely three in five Muslims are literate.
The main chart tracks literacy for each community across the 2001 and 2011 censuses, with Muslims in maroon and the all-India average as the dashed line; a rising line means literacy is improving. Because the distance between communities is the point, the vertical axis does not start at zero. The tabs break the same measure down further: By state shows how far the Muslim rate swings across India, By sex exposes the wide gap between Muslim men and women, and Urban vs rural shows how much lower literacy runs in Muslim villages than in Muslim towns.
Literacy is the floor every other opportunity stands on. It shapes access to formal jobs, government services and scholarships, and a household's ability to handle paperwork, health information and its own legal rights. A community that starts behind on literacy tends to stay behind on income, formal work and schooling in the generation that follows.
Behindgap narrowing
Muslim 68.6% vs Hindu 73.3% in 2011, 4.7pp behind. The gap has closed by a little over a point since 2001, slow but steady progress, and literacy remains lowest for Muslim women and in rural areas.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Share of population aged 7 and above who can both read and write with understanding in any language.
Methodology. Census defines literacy as the ability to read and write with understanding in any language. Two-census series (2001 and 2011, Census C-09 education-by-religion tables); both rounds share the same Census definition, so the 2001 -> 2011 change is a like-for-like comparison. PLFS reports a broadly similar literacy measure on a slightly different definition and is a possible future cross-check; no PLFS series is plotted here today.
Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: lit-7plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Muslim | Hindu |
|---|---|---|
| Haryana | 77.1% | |
| Meghalaya | 77.2% | |
| Bihar | 62.9% | |
| Nagaland | 80.0% | |
| Uttar Pradesh | 69.7% | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 79.1% | |
| Punjab | 80.1% | |
| Assam | 77.7% | |
| Rajasthan | 66.1% | |
| Uttarakhand | 81.2% | |
| Jharkhand | 67.7% | |
| Himachal Pradesh | 83.1% | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 70.1% | |
| Manipur | 82.0% | |
| West Bengal | 79.1% | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 66.1% | |
| Chandigarh | 85.2% | |
| Madhya Pradesh | 68.6% | |
| NCT of Delhi | 87.3% | |
| Sikkim | 82.0% | |
| Mizoram | 91.8% | |
| Karnataka | 74.4% | |
| Odisha | 73.2% | |
| Gujarat | 77.5% | |
| Tripura | 88.2% | |
| Maharashtra | 81.8% | |
| Chhattisgarh | 69.8% | |
| Goa | 88.7% | |
| Daman & Diu | 87.1% | |
| Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 75.6% | |
| Tamil Nadu | 78.8% | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | 87.0% | |
| Puducherry | 85.1% | |
| Lakshadweep | 93.9% | |
| Kerala | 93.5% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 74.8% | 62.1% |
| Other | 70.9% | 49.1% |
| Hindu | 81.7% | 64.4% |
| Sikh | 80.0% | 70.3% |
| Buddhist | 88.3% | 74.1% |
| Christian | 87.7% | 81.5% |
| Jain | 96.8% | 92.9% |
| All communities | 80.9% | 64.7% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 76.6% | 63.1% |
| Other | 79.7% | 57.8% |
| Hindu | 85.3% | 68.2% |
| Sikh | 86.5% | 70.9% |
| Buddhist | 87.3% | 76.7% |
| Christian | 92.9% | 78.7% |
| Jain | 96.5% | 88.6% |
| All communities | 84.2% | 67.8% |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
What a household spends on one school student in an academic year: course fees, textbooks and stationery, uniform, transport and other items. Private coaching is counted separately and left out of this figure. For every INR 100 a Hindu household spends on a student's schooling, a Muslim household spends about INR 71. The reason is not that more Muslim children sit in free government schools: both communities use them at almost the same rate (55.4% and 56.5% of students). Muslim families spend less on fees, books and transport in whichever type of school their children attend.
In 2025 a Muslim household spent about INR 9,249 a year on one school child's fees, books, uniform and transport, against INR 12,941 in a Hindu household and INR 12,616 nationally. Both communities lean on free government schools at similar rates, so the shortfall of more than a quarter reflects what families can afford to add on top, not a different choice of school.
The chart compares yearly per-student school spending across communities for 2017 and 2025; this is money spent, not an outcome, so neither higher nor lower is automatically good. Private coaching is excluded. The Urban vs rural tab shows the gap is widest in towns, where better-off families spend the most.
What a family can put behind each child, the books, a uniform, transport and the occasional extra, shapes how well that child does in the same classroom. Persistent under-spending is one of the quiet ways an income gap turns into an education gap.
Contextgap widening
Muslim INR 9,249 vs Hindu INR 12,941 in 2025, INR 3,692 lower. The gap has held as spending rose across the board, so Muslim families are adding less per child even as every community spends more.
Definition. What a household spends on one school student in an academic year: course fees, textbooks and stationery, uniform, transport and other items. Private coaching is counted separately and left out of this figure. Muslim and Hindu families use free government schools at almost the same rate, so the gap is not about school choice: Muslim households spend less on fees, books and transport in whichever type of school their children attend.
Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of two NSS education rounds: the 75th (Sch 25.2, July 2017 - June 2018, 1.14 lakh households, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes) and the Comprehensive Modular Survey: Education (CMS:E, NSS 80th round, April - June 2025, 52,085 households, via the NADA CSV distribution). Average expenditure per student currently enrolled at school levels (pre-primary to higher secondary, incl. diploma/certificate up to higher-secondary equivalent) during the current academic year, excluding private coaching in both rounds (the CMS:E published headline construct; the 75th collects coaching as a separate item, so the build drops it for comparability). The 2017-18 estimator reproduces all 27 published anchor cells of NSS Report 585 Statements 19 and 21 within 0.01%; the 2025 estimator reproduces all seven published Report 595 per-student cells within 0.01%.
Neither publication breaks expenditure down by religion. A Muslim school student's year cost INR 9,249 against the all-India INR 12,616 in 2025 (Hindu INR 12,941), down as a share from 2017-18 (INR 5,532 against 7,041 all-India, Hindu 7,050): the Muslim household spends about 72% of what the Hindu household spends per student, where it was 78%. Unlike hospital costs, school choice is not the driver: 55.4% of Muslim students attend government schools against 56.5% of Hindu students (2025), so the gap comes from how much families spend in whichever school they use (fees, books, transport), not from heavier use of free government schools.
The trend line renders dashed: Report 595's own comparability section lists concept revisions vs the 75th round (school-only coverage, anganwadi counted as pre-primary, age universe 3+, itemised coaching), so the step between rounds is indicative. Values are nominal rupees of each round. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, not religions, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates.
Where this data comes from. CMS:E 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Download CSV: school-edu-spend.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | INR 13,987 | INR 6,812 |
| Hindu | INR 25,588 | INR 8,329 |
| Christian | INR 23,086 | INR 10,004 |
| Sikh | INR 29,565 | INR 22,289 |
| All communities | INR 23,470 | INR 8,382 |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: CMS:E 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Of every 100 young people in the college-going age band (18 to 23), how many are attending higher education, a graduate or postgraduate course. Measured from a household survey, so every community is counted the same way.
higher is better
Just 14.5% of Muslims aged 18 to 23 were attending higher education in 2017, against 24.2% of Hindus and 22.8% nationally: the lowest rate of any major community. Fewer than 15 in every 100 college-age Muslims are in a degree course, so the school-level literacy gap widens into a much larger gap at the top of the system.
The chart sets the Muslim higher-education attendance rate beside Hindus, the all-India average and other communities for 2017, the one year a household survey measured it the same way for everyone; taller is better. This is a single snapshot, not a trend, so there is no line over time. The By sex tab splits the rate into Muslim men and women.
Higher education is the gateway to secure, salaried and professional work. A community that sends a far smaller share of its young people to college stays concentrated in informal, low-paid jobs, and the disadvantage compounds across generations.
Behind
Muslim 14.5% vs Hindu 24.2% in 2017, 9.7pp behind. This is the widest community gap on the dashboard at the top of the education ladder, and it follows directly from the weaker school completion that comes before it.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Of every 100 young people in the college-going age band (18 to 23), how many are attending higher education: a graduate or postgraduate degree course (after Class 12). Measured from a household survey that asks each family directly, so Muslims, Hindus and the all-India average are counted the same way.
Methodology. NSS Gross Attendance Ratio for "post higher secondary": persons currently attending graduate or postgraduate study (any age; NSS "level of current enrolment" codes 15 and 16) over the population aged 18-23, x100, from NSS 75th round Schedule 25.2 (Household Social Consumption: Education, July 2017-June 2018) unit-level data. Code 14 (diploma/certificate at graduation level) is excluded; including it overshoots the published cells by ~6%, and codes 15+16 reproduce all nine NSS Report 585 Statement 8 cells (rural/urban/all x male/female/person) to within 0.05pp. The statement does not split by religion, so the religion split is that validated pipeline applied to the religion-of-head variable.
This REPLACES the former AISHE administrative GER, which tagged only ~7% of all enrolment to a religion and so undercounted every community (its grouped "Other Minority Community" read ~13%, impossible for the highly-educated Christian/Sikh/Jain communities it pools) and published no Hindu figure. On the household-survey basis Muslims attend at 14.5%, Hindus 24.2%, all-India 22.8% (matching the published figure exactly): Muslims are at about 60% of the Hindu rate, the lowest of the major communities, with Muslim women (12.1%) below Muslim men (16.8%). Single validated round, so a snapshot: PLFS publishes no attendance ratio and runs ~8pp high for the same year, and the 71st (2014) education round is Nesstar-locked.
Where this data comes from. NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Download CSV: ger-higher-ed.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 16.8% | 12.1% |
| Hindu | 26.1% | 22.0% |
| Sikh | 21.6% | 27.7% |
| Christian | 24.6% | 32.1% |
| All communities | 24.7% | 20.7% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Of people aged 15 and older, what share is in the workforce, either working or actively looking for work. The series now reaches back two decades: participation fell economy-wide from 2004 to 2017 and recovered after, with the Muslim rate trailing throughout.
higher is better
About 55% of Muslims aged 15 and over were working or looking for work in 2023, against 61% of Hindus, but the whole of that gap is among women. Muslim men take part at slightly higher rates than Hindu men; Muslim women, at 30%, sit far below Hindu women at 43%, and that single gap pulls the community total down.
The chart tracks the share of adults in the labour force across two decades, from the older Employment surveys to the newer PLFS; the dashed break at 2017 marks the change of survey, so do not read the step there as a real fall. The By sex tab is the one to open here: it shows the gap is almost entirely about women. Working vs looking separates the employed from those still searching, and Urban vs rural splits the rate by place.
How many adults work or seek work sets the ceiling on a community's income. A large pool of working-age people outside the labour force, most of them women, means fewer earners in each household and less to go around.
Behindgap narrowing
Muslim 55.0% vs Hindu 60.9% in 2023, 5.9pp behind. The headline gap has narrowed over twenty years, but largely because participation drifted down for everyone; the low rate among Muslim women is the part that has barely moved.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Of everyone aged 15 and older, the share either working or actively looking for work.
Methodology. The 2023-24 point is PLFS 2023-24 Table 48 (pages 396-400), total residence, person-level; reference period Jul 2023 - Jun 2024 (year=2023 in the canonical row is the start of this period). The 2017-18 to 2022-23 points are computed from each PLFS round's unit-level microdata, pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: the report PDFs publish the 15+ religion split only for their own year, but the microdata carries household religion in every round. The computation reproduces each round's published all-India LFPR to 0.1 points and the 2023-24 religion table within 0.2, so the published point extends the same series.
The 2004/2009/2011 points reach back through the three quinquennial NSS Employment & Unemployment Survey rounds (61st/66th/68th), computed the same way from their unit data and reproducing the published by-religion statements of NSS Reports 568/552 cell-for-cell; the EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable, so the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Two decades tell one story: participation fell economy-wide between 2004-05 and 2017-18 (Muslim 15+ LFPR 55.1% to 45.0%, all-India 63.7% to 49.8%) and recovered after, but the Muslim rate has trailed the all-India rate by 5-9 points in every round since 2004. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider: indicative, no sub-state estimates).
The "Working vs looking" tab sets this rate against the worker population ratio (share actually working, wpr-15plus.csv) from the same source; the gap between them is unemployment.
Where this data comes from. PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: lfpr-15plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
The labour force is everyone working or looking for work, so the two bars sit almost on top of each other. The gap between them is unemployment: just 1.8 points for Muslims, and small for every community. Muslims rank last on participation not because they cannot find work, but because fewer enter the labour force at all, above all Muslim women (the By sex tab).
| Community | In labour force | Working |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 55.0% | 53.2% |
| Christian | 62.8% | 59.9% |
| Hindu | 60.9% | 59.1% |
| Sikh | 56.1% | 52.8% |
| All communities | 60.1% | 58.2% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Values come from lfpr-15plus.csv (in labour force) and wpr-15plus.csv (working); every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 80.6% | 30.2% |
| Sikh | 79.2% | 33.0% |
| Hindu | 78.6% | 43.3% |
| Christian | 76.3% | 50.4% |
| All communities | 78.8% | 41.7% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 49.4% | 58.2% |
| Sikh | 48.8% | 58.6% |
| Hindu | 52.5% | 64.4% |
| Christian | 52.9% | 68.6% |
| All communities | 52.0% | 63.7% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Of people in the labour force (working or looking for work), what share cannot find work. A low rate is not automatically good news: people who cannot afford to stay unemployed take any informal work, so read it beside the salaried-jobs card.
lower is better
At 3.2%, measured Muslim unemployment in 2023 was barely above the Hindu rate of 3.1%, and well below its late-2010s peak. But a low unemployment rate is not the good news it looks like: people who cannot afford to sit idle take whatever informal work they can find, so distress, not comfort, often keeps the number down.
The chart tracks the share of the labour force that is unemployed; the 2017 dashed break marks the switch to the PLFS survey. Read it alongside the salaried-jobs and consumption cards, because a low rate here sits next to low-paid, insecure work. The By sex and Urban vs rural tabs show where joblessness concentrates: among the educated, the urban and the young.
Open unemployment counts only those who can hold out for a job. For a poorer community it understates the real problem, which is not idleness but the scarcity of secure, decently paid work.
At paritygap narrowing
Muslim 3.2% vs Hindu 3.1% in 2023, about level. Muslim unemployment ran clearly above the Hindu rate from 2017 to 2019 and has since converged; the gap that matters now is in the quality of work, not the headline rate.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Of the labour force aged 15 and older (everyone working or looking for work), the share that cannot find work. A low rate is not automatically good news here: people who cannot afford to be unemployed take any informal work, so read this beside the salaried-jobs card.
Methodology. The 2017-18 to 2023-24 points are computed from each round's PLFS unit-level microdata, pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: the published PLFS annual reports never break the unemployment rate down by religion, so the microdata is the only source for that stretch. The 2004/2009/2011 points come from the three quinquennial EUS rounds (NSS 61st/66th/68th) the same way, and there the gate is direct: the computation reproduces the published by-religion unemployment rates of NSS Reports 568/552. The EUS era shows the same pattern in miniature: Muslim unemployment (2.3-3.0%) sat above the all-India rate (2.0-2.3%) in all three rounds, before both spiked in 2017-18.
EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable; the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Unemployed = usual principal status 81 (seeking/available for work); labour force = workers (ps+ss) plus unemployed; weights per the official estimation rule. The computation reproduces each round's published all-India unemployment rate to 0.1 points.
Muslim unemployment fell from 7.2% (2017-18, a point above the national 6.0%) to 3.2% (2023-24, at par with the national average), but over the same rounds the salaried share of Muslim workers also fell, so part of the convergence is absorption into self-employment and casual work rather than formal hiring. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider: indicative, no sub-state estimates). Year=Y is the start of the Jul-Y to Jun-(Y+1) reference period.
Where this data comes from. PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: unemployment-rate-15plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| Community | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 3.1% | 3.6% |
| Hindu | 3.1% | 2.9% |
| Christian | 4.3% | 5.5% |
| Sikh | 5.0% | 7.9% |
| All communities | 3.2% | 3.2% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 4.5% | 2.6% |
| Hindu | 5.1% | 2.4% |
| Christian | 6.6% | 3.9% |
| Sikh | 6.2% | 5.7% |
| All communities | 5.1% | 2.5% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Of all workers, what share has regular salaried jobs (as opposed to self-employment or casual labour). The Muslim share has trailed the all-India share in every survey round for two decades, and the gap is wider today than in 2004.
higher is better
Just 18% of Muslim workers hold a regular salaried job, against 22% of Hindus; most Muslims work for themselves or as casual labour. The gap is starkest in cities, where salaried work is common: there, about a third of Muslim workers are salaried, against half of Hindus.
The chart tracks the share of workers in regular salaried jobs over two decades, with the 2017 dashed break marking the move to the PLFS survey. The Urban vs rural tab carries the real story: the salaried gap is small in villages but very wide in towns. What it pays compares earnings inside those salaried jobs, and By sex splits the rate by gender.
A regular salaried job means a predictable wage, and often paid leave, provident fund and some security. The shortage of such jobs is the core of the Muslim economic disadvantage: not that Muslims do not work, but that their work is more often informal, self-run and insecure.
Behindgap widening
Muslim 18.0% vs Hindu 21.9% in 2023, 3.9pp behind. The salaried share has risen for Muslims over twenty years, but the gap with Hindus has held, and it stays widest exactly where formal jobs are most available, in the cities.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Of all workers, the share in regular salaried jobs rather than self-employment or casual labour.
Methodology. The 2023-24 point is PLFS 2023-24 Table 49 (pages 401-402), rural+urban person-level. Muslims are disproportionately self-employed (62.2% vs Hindu 58.3%) and under-represented in formal salaried work, the classic Sachar-era finding on labour-market segregation. The 2017-18 to 2022-23 points are computed from each PLFS round's unit-level microdata via the MoSPI NADA API (the PDFs publish this religion split only for their own year; the computation reproduces the 2023-24 published table within 0.2 points); the 2004/2009/2011 points come from the three quinquennial EUS rounds (NSS 61st/66th/68th), reproducing the published status-of-employment statements of NSS Reports 568/552.
The long view sharpens the finding: the Muslim salaried share has trailed the all-India share in every round for two decades (12.8% vs 14.4% in 2004-05, 16.2% vs 17.9% in 2011-12, 18.0% vs 21.7% in 2023-24), and within the PLFS years it FELL from its 2018-19 peak (22.2%) while participation rose, so the participation gains came in self-employment and casual work, not regular salaried jobs. EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable; the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider).
The "What it pays" tab folds in the pay counterpart computed from the same microdata rounds (the decarded salaried-earnings metric, anchored to the published all-ages earnings tables of the 2021-22 to 2023-24 reports across all 27 residence-by-sex cells within 0.03%): Muslim salaried workers earn 16-23% below the all-India average in every round (2023-24: INR 17,747 vs INR 21,067), so Muslims are both less likely to hold a regular salaried job and paid less when they do. Earnings rupees are nominal, so the comparable story is the gap, not the level.
Where this data comes from. PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: salaried-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Of all workers, the share holding a regular GOVERNMENT salaried job (government, local bodies and public-sector undertakings), computed from PLFS 2023-24 microdata. About 2.8% of Muslim workers hold a public-sector job, against 5.0% of Hindus and 4.9% nationally, the lowest of any major community. Set against the host card: of the 18% of Muslim workers who are salaried, only about a sixth are in the secure public sector, so most of the Muslim salaried shortfall sits in government jobs, a long-standing Sachar Committee finding. Private salaried work is the rest.
| Community | In govt jobs |
|---|---|
| Muslim | 2.8% |
| Buddhist | 11.6% |
| Christian | 9.0% |
| Other | 6.4% |
| Sikh | 5.6% |
| Jain | 5.2% |
| Hindu | 5.0% |
| All communities | 4.9% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Average monthly pay in regular salaried jobs (gross, preceding month, age 15+). Muslim salaried workers earned INR 17,747 a month in 2023 against the all-India INR 21,067, about 16% less, and the gap has stayed at 16-23% in every round since 2017-18. Rupees are nominal, so the rising lines mostly track inflation; the gap between the lines is the comparable story.
| Community | Overall | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | INR 17,747 | INR 18,396 | INR 16,811 |
| Christian | INR 25,093 | INR 28,010 | INR 21,176 |
| Hindu | INR 21,344 | INR 25,032 | INR 16,528 |
| Sikh | INR 17,055 | INR 22,349 | INR 13,783 |
| All communities | INR 21,067 | INR 24,440 | INR 16,658 |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 20.8% | 10.9% |
| Hindu | 25.3% | 15.8% |
| Christian | 28.4% | 26.3% |
| Sikh | 26.7% | 26.9% |
| All communities | 24.9% | 15.9% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 32.7% | 11.0% |
| Hindu | 50.0% | 12.7% |
| Christian | 52.4% | 16.8% |
| Sikh | 45.7% | 21.4% |
| All communities | 47.5% | 12.7% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
How much a typical person in a community spends in a month, on food, rent, fuel, clothes and everything else. In India this is the usual way to measure how well-off people are, because reliable income data does not exist.
higher is better
An average Muslim spent INR 4,455 a month in 2023, about a tenth less than the INR 4,974 a Hindu spent and below the national INR 4,958. Spending is the standard yardstick of living standards in India, used because no reliable income figure by religion exists, and on it Muslims sit at the lower end.
The chart compares average monthly spending per person across communities; higher means a higher material standard of living. The By state tab shows how far this swings across India, Top spending fifth looks at the better-off slice of each community, and Urban vs rural splits town from village. Spending gaps are narrower than wealth gaps, because even poorer households must spend to live.
Monthly spending is the closest thing to a living-standards thermometer India has by religion. It rolls food, rent, fuel, schooling and health into one figure, and a persistent gap means a persistently lower standard of everyday life.
Behind
Muslim INR 4,455 vs Hindu INR 4,974 in 2023, INR 519 behind. The Muslim shortfall in spending, around a tenth, is smaller than the gap in wealth, the deeper divide; consumption gaps compress because everyone must eat and pay rent.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Average monthly spending per person (Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure, MPCE). In India this is the standard measure of economic well-being, used in place of income, for which no reliable figure by religion exists.
Methodology. The 2023-24 figure is computed from the unit-level microdata of HCES 2023-24 (NSO, 2.61 lakh households), pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: weighted monthly per capita consumption expenditure (food + consumables & services + durables, 365-day items annualised), cross-classified by the religion of the household head. The method reproduces the published national MPCE (rural INR 4,122 / urban INR 6,996) within about 2% before the religion split is taken. NSO's note for unit-level users cautions that religion is self-reported and unverified and that the survey is designed to estimate MPCE with the State/UT as the basic stratum, so the religion figures are best read as indicative, no sub-state estimates are made, and the survey's internal Muslim population share (13%) sits a little below the Census.
The earlier benchmark is the Sachar Committee (2006) from the NSS 61st round (2004-05): Muslims INR 635 vs the all-India INR 712, near SC/ST (INR 520) and far below upper-caste 'Hindu General' households (INR 1,023). The two rounds use different consumption methods (2004-05 URP vs 2023-24 MMRP) and rupees are nominal, so the level change over time is mostly inflation; the comparable story is the relative gap, which is stable at about 10% below the national average across the 20 years and is widest in towns (urban Muslims INR 5,467 vs urban Hindus INR 7,064). The By state tab shows the 2023-24 per-state Muslim MPCE computed from the same microdata, urban and rural separately (State/UT is the survey's basic stratum, so this is the finest permitted cut; cells with fewer than 30 sampled Muslim households are suppressed).
The Sachar 2004-05 state figures remain in the downloadable data file. The "Top spending fifth" tab folds in the distribution counterpart computed from the same microdata with the same validated MPCE machinery (the decarded top-quintile-share metric): person-weighted national MPCE quintile cuts (INR 2,903 / 3,677 / 4,632 / 6,302 per person per month), with every all-India quintile share equal to 20.0 by construction as the built-in validation. Muslims sit at par in the poorest fifth (20.5%) but only 13.7% reach the richest fifth (Hindu 20.2%, Christian 30.0%, Sikh 40.6%), and the squeeze is urban: 26.3% of urban Muslims reach the national top fifth against 45.3% of urban Hindus.
Where this data comes from. HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Download CSV: mpce.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Of each community's population, the share living in households in the top 20% of spending nationally. An even spread would put every community at 20.0%; only 13.7% of Muslims reach the top fifth, and the squeeze is urban: 26.3% of urban Muslims make the national top fifth against 45.3% of urban Hindus. Muslims sit at par in the poorest fifth, so the distribution is compressed below the top, not crowded at the bottom.
| Community | Overall | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 13.7% | 26.3% | 6.5% |
| Sikh | 40.6% | 58.5% | 34.4% |
| Christian | 30.0% | 57.4% | 17.9% |
| Hindu | 20.2% | 45.3% | 10.1% |
| All communities | 20.0% | 42.9% | 10.3% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | INR 9,652 | INR 8,017 |
| Tamil Nadu | INR 7,211 | INR 5,690 |
| Telangana | INR 6,632 | INR 5,059 |
| Kerala | INR 6,621 | INR 5,422 |
| Tripura | INR 6,567 | INR 6,232 |
| Punjab | INR 6,461 | INR 5,144 |
| Haryana | INR 6,243 | INR 5,659 |
| Maharashtra | INR 5,977 | INR 4,000 |
| Andhra Pradesh | INR 5,975 | INR 5,124 |
| Lakshadweep | INR 5,881 | INR 6,654 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | INR 5,850 | INR 4,625 |
| Ladakh | INR 5,742 | INR 4,186 |
| Karnataka | INR 5,670 | INR 4,348 |
| Odisha | INR 5,589 | INR 3,951 |
| Gujarat | INR 5,491 | INR 4,066 |
| Jharkhand | INR 5,478 | INR 3,273 |
| Manipur | INR 5,410 | INR 4,924 |
| Uttarakhand | INR 5,384 | INR 4,534 |
| Rajasthan | INR 4,955 | INR 4,488 |
| Assam | INR 4,855 | INR 3,439 |
| Bihar | INR 4,715 | INR 3,669 |
| Madhya Pradesh | INR 4,643 | INR 3,592 |
| West Bengal | INR 4,463 | INR 3,538 |
| Uttar Pradesh | INR 4,417 | INR 3,526 |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | INR 5,467 | INR 3,874 |
| Hindu | INR 7,064 | INR 4,135 |
| All communities | INR 6,863 | INR 4,149 |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
What an average household owns (land, buildings, livestock, vehicles, financial assets) minus what it owes. Accumulated wealth runs a far wider gap than monthly spending, though the gap narrowed between 2012 and 2018: urban Muslim households went from holding about half the net worth of urban Hindu households to about two-thirds.
higher is better
The average Muslim household was worth about INR 15.0 lakh in 2018, what it owns minus what it owes, against INR 18.8 lakh for a Hindu household. The wealth gap, about a fifth, runs deeper than the gap in monthly spending, because wealth is the slow build-up of land, property and savings that disadvantage compounds over generations.
The chart compares average household net worth, assets minus debts, for 2012 and 2018. Wealth is a stock, not a flow, so it moves slowly and gaps are wide. The Borrowing sources tab shows where each community turns for credit, banks or moneylenders, and Urban vs rural splits the two.
Wealth is the cushion that income is not: it pays for a medical emergency, a business or a child's education without borrowing at ruinous rates. A thinner cushion leaves a household one shock away from crisis, with less to pass on.
Behindgap narrowing
Muslim INR 15.0 lakh vs Hindu INR 18.8 lakh in 2018, INR 3.8 lakh behind. Muslim household wealth grew faster than Hindu wealth between 2012 and 2018, closing the ratio a little, but the absolute gap remains around a fifth.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. What an average household owns (land, buildings, livestock, machinery, vehicles, financial assets) minus what it owes, measured by the national debt and investment survey as on mid-2012 and mid-2018. Wealth is the stock that spending cannot show, and wealth gaps compound across generations, so they run far wider than spending gaps.
Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of AIDIS (All-India Debt & Investment Survey) Visit 1, two rounds: NSS 70th (1.11 lakh households, assets and debt as on 30.06.2012, via the MoSPI NADA API) and NSS 77th (1.16 lakh households, as on 30.06.2018, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes). The published reports break wealth down by social group but never by religion. The 2018 estimator reproduces the published all-India average assets and average debt EXACTLY to the rupee; 2012 reproduces debt and indebtedness exactly and assets within 0.75% (a documented empty-column defect in MoSPI's own CSV conversion of the non-farm-equipment block).
Muslim households held INR 15.0 lakh in 2018 against the all-India INR 18.9 lakh (79%) and Hindu INR 18.8 lakh (80%), up from 66% and 67% in 2012; the urban gap narrowed most, with urban Muslim households moving from 51% to 67% of urban Hindu net worth (INR 18.0 vs 26.7 lakh in 2018) while rural moved from 83% to 87%. Values are nominal rupees of each round's reference date. Gold and ornaments sit outside the published asset concept (roughly 3-4% on top); land is valued at guideline rather than market rates.
Values rounded to the nearest INR 1,000. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates. The "Borrowing sources" tab folds in the companion measure from the same microdata (the decarded institutional-credit-share metric): the institutional share of outstanding cash debt among indebted households, reproducing the published all-India shares in both rounds (2012 rural 56.0 / urban 84.5 exactly; 2018 rural 66 / urban 87).
There the trend cuts the other way: the Muslim share stood still (68.3% to 68.7%) while the Hindu share rose (72.4% to 77.1%), widening the urban gap to 17 points (71.3 vs 88.4). Muslims also borrow the least overall (26.8% of households indebted vs Hindu 31.4% in 2018). Credit-agency code 09 "others" is non-institutional despite its position in the code list in both rounds (the layout trap is documented in the repo).
Where this data comes from. AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Download CSV: household-net-worth.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Of the money indebted households owe, the share borrowed from institutional lenders (banks, co-operatives, government and related agencies) rather than moneylenders, shopkeepers or relatives. Informal credit is costlier and unprotected. As Indian borrowing formalised between 2012 and 2018 the Muslim share stood still (68.3% to 68.7%) while the Hindu share rose (72.4% to 77.1%), and the urban gap widened: 71.3% of urban Muslim debt is institutional against 88.4% for urban Hindus. Muslims also borrow the least overall: 26.8% of Muslim households were indebted against 31.4% of Hindu households in 2018.
| Community | Overall | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muslim | 68.7% | 71.3% | 66.1% |
| Sikh | 82.7% | 92.9% | 76.0% |
| Hindu | 77.1% | 88.4% | 65.6% |
| Christian | 76.3% | 84.5% | 68.1% |
| All communities | 76.7% | 87.1% | 66.1% |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Community | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| Muslim | INR 18.0 lakh | INR 13.0 lakh |
| Hindu | INR 26.7 lakh | INR 15.0 lakh |
| Christian | INR 28.2 lakh | INR 16.0 lakh |
| Sikh | INR 50.1 lakh | INR 45.0 lakh |
| All communities | INR 26.0 lakh | INR 15.3 lakh |
From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Far fewer elected seats than their share of the population, both in the Lok Sabha and across the state assemblies.
How many of the 543 seats in India's national parliament (Lok Sabha) are held by Muslim MPs, counted at every general election since 1952. At the community's 14.2% population share, parity would be 77 seats; the count peaked at 49 in 1980 and stands at 24 today.
Muslims hold 24 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha elected in 2024, about 4.4%, against a 14.2% share of the population. If seats matched population there would be roughly 77 Muslim MPs. Representation in Parliament peaked in the 1980s and has drifted down since, even as the population share rose.
The chart tracks the number, and share, of Muslim members of the Lok Sabha at each general election since 1952, against the population-parity mark of 77 seats. This card counts seats won, not votes cast or candidates fielded, so it measures outcomes, not effort.
Who sits in the legislature shapes which concerns reach the floor, which laws pass and how budgets are shared. Persistent under-representation of a seventh of the country means a large community's voice is thinner in the rooms where decisions are made.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. How many of the 543 seats in India's national parliament (Lok Sabha) are held by Muslim MPs, counted at every general election since 1952. At the community's 14.2% population share, parity would be 77 seats; the count peaked at 49 in 1980 and stands at 24 today.
Methodology. Religion is not tabulated by either ECI or PRS Legislative Research in their official candidate-profile publications. Underlying data is ECI candidate affidavits classified post-election by journalists and researchers. Figures cross-verified across multiple sources: Maktoob Media, FACTLY, The India Forum, Statista.
Documented as "manual entry" canonical with citations in each row's methodology note. The series covers all 18 general elections, 1952-2024: the 1952-2004 figures are from historical compilations (The India Forum, Statista), 2009 onward cross-verified across the sources above. The card displays the absolute number of Muslim MPs per house (user call, Commit FW: counts read more directly than shares); the percentage rides in the canonical data, where the denominator record carries each house's N-of-M seat count, and house sizes ranged from 489 (1952) to 543 (since 1996).
Representation peaked at 49 MPs (9%) in 1980 and has sat between 22 and 27 since 2014: 2009=28/543, 2014=22/543, 2019=27/543, 2024=24/543. At the Muslim population share of ~14.2%, parity in the current house would be 77 seats, a chronic shortfall of about 50 seats. The state-assembly layer of the same affidavit-classified sourcing is the separate "Muslim share of state assemblies" card (about 6% of seats across the 31 covered assemblies).
Where this data comes from. PRS / ECI affidavits. Download CSV: ls-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Hand-compiled Reproduce this. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Across all 31 state and UT legislative assemblies that hold elections, what share of MLA seats is held by Muslims. Each state pairs two bars: the maroon share of assembly seats against the grey share of population (Census 2011), so each state's seats can be compared at a glance with its share of the population.
Muslims hold about 6% of seats across India's state legislative assemblies, against a 14.2% population share. The shortfall is narrower than in the Lok Sabha but still wide, and it varies sharply from state to state, which the By assembly tab lays out.
The chart shows the Muslim share of seats in each state and union-territory assembly at its most recent election, with a national aggregate of about 6%. The By assembly tab ranks the states and pairs each one's seat share against its Muslim population share, so you can see where representation tracks numbers and where it falls far short.
State assemblies decide on policing, land, health and schooling, the services that touch daily life most directly. Thin representation in them means fewer voices on exactly the local decisions that shape a community's living conditions.
Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.
Definition. Percentage of state legislative assembly seats held by Muslim MLAs. National aggregate (~6%) plus per-assembly values for all 31 state + UT assemblies that hold elections (28 states + Delhi, Puducherry, J&K, most-recent election per assembly, spanning 2020-2026). Each state pairs two bars: the maroon share of assembly seats against the grey share of population (Census 2011), so each state's seats can be compared at a glance with its share of the population.
Methodology. Manual-entry metric, like ls-share: religion is not officially tabulated by ECI or PRS. Underlying data is candidate-affidavit religion classified post-election by journalists (Maktoob, Clarion, India Forum, The Wire, Deccan Herald, Outlook, Radiance Weekly, Free Press Journal, ummid.com, thenewzradar). National aggregate ~6% across the 31 covered assemblies.
Highest: J&K 60% (2024, first election since Article 370 reorg); Kerala 25%, Assam 24.6%. Lowest: HP / Goa / Mizoram / Nagaland / Sikkim / Arunachal / Chhattisgarh / Tripura / Meghalaya, all 0% (most have never elected a Muslim MLA in state history). Each row's methodology_note cites the source compilation(s) used.
The per-state population context (the grey bars and the By-assembly table's population column) is the Census 2011 Muslim share: the J&K figure includes pre-2019 Ladakh, and Telangana's figure (12.7%) is aggregated from the ten undivided-Andhra-Pradesh census districts that formed the state in 2014, Hyderabad included.
Where this data comes from. PRS / ECI affidavits. Download CSV: mla-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Hand-compiled Reproduce this. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Muslims hold about 6% of seats across the 31 state and UT assemblies covered, each at its most recent election, against a 14.2% share of the population. Jammu & Kashmir leads at 60.0%; 9 assemblies have no Muslim MLA at all. Each row pairs the maroon seat-share bar with a grey bar for the state's Muslim population share (Census 2011; the J&K figure includes pre-2019 Ladakh, and Telangana's aggregates the ten undivided-AP districts that formed the state in 2014).
| Assembly | Election | Muslim MLAs | Seat share | Population share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jammu & Kashmir | 2024 | 54 of 90 | 68.3% | |
| Kerala | 2026 | 35 of 140 | 26.6% | |
| Assam | 2021 | 31 of 126 | 34.2% | |
| West Bengal | 2026 | 40 of 293 | 27.0% | |
| Uttar Pradesh | 2022 | 34 of 403 | 19.3% | |
| Bihar | 2020 | 19 of 243 | 16.9% | |
| Telangana | 2023 | 7 of 119 | 12.7% | |
| NCT of Delhi | 2025 | 4 of 70 | 12.9% | |
| Haryana | 2024 | 5 of 90 | 7.0% | |
| Uttarakhand | 2022 | 3 of 70 | 13.9% | |
| Karnataka | 2023 | 9 of 224 | 12.9% | |
| Jharkhand | 2024 | 3 of 81 | 14.5% | |
| Maharashtra | 2024 | 10 of 288 | 11.5% | |
| Puducherry | 2021 | 1 of 30 | 6.1% | |
| Rajasthan | 2023 | 6 of 200 | 9.1% | |
| Tamil Nadu | 2021 | 5 of 234 | 5.9% | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 2024 | 3 of 175 | 9.6% | |
| Manipur | 2022 | 1 of 60 | 8.4% | |
| Gujarat | 2022 | 3 of 182 | 9.7% | |
| Madhya Pradesh | 2023 | 2 of 230 | 6.6% | |
| Punjab | 2022 | 1 of 117 | 1.9% | |
| Odisha | 2024 | 1 of 147 | 2.2% | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 2024 | 0 of 60 | 2.0% | |
| Sikkim | 2024 | 0 of 32 | 1.6% | |
| Chhattisgarh | 2023 | 0 of 90 | 2.0% | |
| Tripura | 2023 | 0 of 60 | 8.6% | |
| Meghalaya | 2023 | 0 of 60 | 4.4% | |
| Nagaland | 2023 | 0 of 60 | 2.5% | |
| Mizoram | 2023 | 0 of 40 | 1.4% | |
| Himachal Pradesh | 2022 | 0 of 68 | 2.2% | |
| Goa | 2022 | 0 of 40 | 8.3% |
Hand-compiled Reproduce this view. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Source: PRS / ECI affidavits. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Over-represented in the prison and undertrial populations per head of community, alongside police-recorded communal incidents.
For every 100,000 people of a religion, how many are in prison. Allows fair comparison across communities of different size.
lower is better
Muslims are imprisoned at about 63 per 100,000 of their population, against 40 for Hindus and 45 nationally, so a Muslim is around one and a half times as likely to be in jail as the average Indian. Most of this is not about conviction: a large majority of all prisoners are undertrials, awaiting trial rather than found guilty, and Muslims are over-represented among them.
The chart compares the incarceration rate, prisoners per 100,000 of each community's own population, so it is not distorted by community size. The Undertrials tab is the one to read closely: it shows how much of the gap is people held awaiting trial, not convicts. By state shows how sharply this varies across India.
Who is in prison, and who waits there untried, is one of the clearest tests of equal justice. Over-incarceration, especially of the unconvicted, falls hardest on poor families who lose an earner and cannot afford bail or a lawyer.
Behind
Muslim 63.3 vs Hindu 39.8 in 2022, 23.5 behind. The gap is driven less by convictions than by pre-trial detention: most Muslim prisoners are undertrials, where poverty, the cost of bail and slow courts weigh heaviest.
Definition. Incarceration rate: prisoners of religion R per 100,000 of religion R's total population. More direct measure of disproportion than "share of prisoners", comparable across religions without needing to know population baselines.
Methodology. Cross-source: NCRB PSI 2022 total prisoner count (convicts + undertrials + detenues + other prisoners; STATES + UTs subtotals = ALL-INDIA by construction) divided by Census 2011 national religious population times 100,000. The 'denominator' column on each canonical row records the exact (count, population) pair used. Caveat: Maharashtra non-reporting of religion for ~33k undertrials/detenues, so the religion-reported numerator excludes those; full national population is the denominator.
The "Undertrials" tab folds in the sister metric (the decarded undertrial-rate-per-100k, NCRB PSI 2022 Table 2.11C over the same Census 2011 denominators): 48.8 Muslim undertrials per 100,000 against 29.3 Hindu and 33.2 all-India, a sharper over-representation than for prisoners overall, so the disproportion is largest before any conviction. Same Maharashtra caveat applies.
Where this data comes from. NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Download CSV: prison-rate-per-100k.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
Undertrial prisoners are in jail awaiting trial, not convicted of anything. For every 100,000 Muslims, 48.8 were undertrials in 2022, against 29.3 per 100,000 Hindus and 33.2 all-India. Relative to the all-India rate the Muslim over-representation is sharper among undertrials than among prisoners overall (1.5x vs 1.4x), so the disproportion is largest before any conviction. Same Maharashtra religion-reporting caveat as the incarceration chart.
| Community | Per 100,000 |
|---|---|
| Muslim | 48.8 |
| Sikh | 97.5 |
| Christian | 39.1 |
| Hindu | 29.3 |
| All communities | 33.2 |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Muslim | Hindu |
|---|---|---|
| Punjab | 84.2 | |
| Mizoram | 33.2 | |
| NCT of Delhi | 90.9 | |
| Haryana | 91.3 | |
| Chandigarh | 118.6 | |
| Chhattisgarh | 79.1 | |
| Odisha | 41.6 | |
| Uttarakhand | 52.4 | |
| Madhya Pradesh | 63.9 | |
| Nagaland | 52.6 | |
| Sikkim | 66.6 | |
| Goa | 43.2 | |
| Himachal Pradesh | 39.3 | |
| Uttar Pradesh | 53.9 | |
| Meghalaya | 51.7 | |
| Tripura | 27.9 | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 25.9 | |
| Manipur | 26.5 | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | 45.0 | |
| Rajasthan | 30.1 | |
| Jharkhand | 62.1 | |
| Tamil Nadu | 21.4 | |
| Gujarat | 24.3 | |
| Assam | 23.1 | |
| West Bengal | 24.9 | |
| Bihar | 65.3 | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 35.5 | |
| Karnataka | 24.5 | |
| Kerala | 25.9 | |
| Puducherry | 27.0 | |
| Maharashtra | 5.1 | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 8.1 | |
| Lakshadweep | n/a |
Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
Number of communal or religious rioting incidents recorded in police records each year (NCRB).
lower is better
India's official tally of communal or religious rioting incidents was 272 in 2023, down from a recent peak of 869 in 2016, though the count swings sharply from year to year, it was 857 in 2020. Read this number with care: it captures only incidents the police formally recorded under one narrow crime-records category, it is widely regarded as an undercount, and it is not broken down by which community was affected.
The chart tracks the National Crime Records Bureau's annual count of communal and religious rioting incidents from 2015 to 2023; lower is better, but the line is only as complete as official recording. This is one specific NCRB sub-category, so it misses incidents logged under other heads or never registered, and unlike the rest of this dashboard it is not split by religion. The By state tab shows where recorded incidents cluster.
Communal violence falls hardest on minorities, and the threat of it shapes where Muslims feel safe to live, work and worship. An honest, complete count would be one of the most important measures on this dashboard; the distance between what is recorded here and what communities actually experience is itself part of the story.
Definition. Number of communal/religious rioting incidents recorded by NCRB under IPC Sec.147-151 (rioting), specifically the "Communal/Religious" sub-classification. National annual totals (2015-2023) plus state-level breakdown for 2022 and 2023.
Methodology. NCRB Crime in India, Table 1.2 row 23.1 'Communal/Religious' rioting. National series 2015-2023, compiled across multiple Crime in India volumes (CII 2017 through 2023, each carrying a multi-year national panel); state-level breakdown for 2022 and 2023. Incident counts only, with no religion of victim/perpetrator in the published table.
Caveat: several states stopped recording 'communal' as a separate crime category since ~2017, which deflates the national total over time. Civil-society compilations typically report higher counts.
Where this data comes from. NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023). Download CSV: communal-incidents-govt.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.
Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.
| State / UT | Incidents |
|---|---|
| Bihar | |
| Odisha | |
| Maharashtra | |
| Jharkhand | |
| Karnataka | |
| Madhya Pradesh | |
| Haryana | |
| NCT of Delhi | |
| Tamil Nadu | |
| Gujarat | |
| Chhattisgarh | |
| Telangana | |
| Assam | |
| Kerala | |
| Rajasthan | |
| West Bengal | |
| Andhra Pradesh | |
| Arunachal Pradesh | |
| Goa | |
| Himachal Pradesh | |
| Manipur | |
| Meghalaya | |
| Mizoram | |
| Nagaland | |
| Punjab | |
| Sikkim | |
| Tripura | |
| Uttar Pradesh | |
| Uttarakhand | |
| Andaman & Nicobar Islands | |
| Chandigarh | |
| Jammu & Kashmir | |
| Ladakh | |
| Lakshadweep | |
| Puducherry |
Read Reproduce this view. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Source: NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.
| Metric | Year | Muslim | Hindu | All | Gap vs reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Muslims in the Lok Sabha | 2024 | 24 of 543 seats | n/a | n/a | -53 seats vs 77-seat parity (14.2% pop) |
| Muslim incarceration rate | 2022 | 63.3 | 39.8 | 44.6 | +23.5 |
| State MLA Muslim share | 2024 | 6.0% | n/a | n/a | -8.2pp vs 14.2% pop |
| Urban share | 2011 | 39.9% | 29.2% | 31.1% | +10.7pp vs Hindu |
| Higher-education attendance rate | 2017 | 14.5% | 24.2% | 22.8% | -8.3pp vs all communities |
| Spending on school education | 2025 | INR 9,249 | INR 12,941 | INR 12,616 | -3692 |
| Household net worth | 2018 | INR 15.0 lakh | INR 18.8 lakh | INR 18.9 lakh | -390000 |
| Regular salaried share | 2023 | 18.0% | 21.9% | 21.7% | -3.9pp vs Hindu |
| Cost of a hospital stay | 2025 | INR 30,104 | INR 34,323 | INR 34,064 | -4219 |
| Toilet access | 2020 | 90.3% | 80.7% | 82.5% | +9.6pp vs Hindu |
| Clean water at home | 2018 | 69.3% | 62.5% | 63.6% | +6.8pp vs Hindu |
| Monthly spending | 2023 | INR 4,455 | INR 4,974 | INR 4,958 | -503 |
| Labour-force participation | 2023 | 55.0% | 60.9% | 60.1% | -5.9pp vs Hindu |
| Infant mortality rate | 2020 | 33.0 | 35.4 | 34.7 | -2.4 |
| Literacy rate | 2011 | 68.6% | 73.3% | 73.0% | -4.7pp vs Hindu |
| Institutional delivery rate | 2020 | 84.3% | 89.5% | 88.6% | -5.2pp vs Hindu |
| Children stunted (under 5) | 2020 | 36.8% | 35.5% | 35.5% | +1.3pp vs Hindu |
| Unemployment rate | 2023 | 3.2% | 3.1% | 3.2% | +0.1pp vs Hindu |
| Anaemia in women (15-49) | 2020 | 55.6% | 57.4% | 57.0% | -1.8pp vs Hindu |
| Sex ratio | 2011 | 951 | 939 | 943 | +12 |
| Pucca housing | 2018 | 83.6% | 83.3% | 83.3% | +0.3pp vs Hindu |
| Population share | 2011 | 14.2% | 79.8% | n/a | baseline |
| Communal incidents (police) | 2023 | 272 (national aggregate) | NCRB tally; civic counts higher | ||
"Gap" is the Muslim value minus the reference baseline (Hindu where available, otherwise all communities). Red means the Muslim outcome is worse than the reference; green means it is better. For justice metrics, cells show the absolute count alongside the incarceration rate per 100,000 people of that religion, and the gap is the Muslim-to-Hindu rate ratio (1.0× means parity; above 1.0× means Muslims are overrepresented).