muslimdata.in

Last updated 29 July 2026

The state of Muslim India, in data

India's roughly 17 crore (170 million) Muslims, or 14.2% of the population (Census 2011), trail the all-India average on 11 of the 17 indicators that allow a direct comparison, widest on muslims in the Lok Sabha, state MLA Muslim share, and Muslim incarceration rate. They run ahead on a handful (toilet access, clean water at home, and infant mortality rate).

Each card sets the latest Muslim figure beside Hindu and all-India baselines, drawn from 25 primary government sources. OpenTap any card for its chart, method and source. How these are measured →

Watch a short tour

Compare Muslim outcomes to:

Demographics

India's largest religious minority, more urban than the national average and concentrated in a handful of districts in the north and east.

How much of India's population is Muslim, by the latest census.

14.2%of all Indians(2011)
Hindu's share drifted from 83.4% in 1961 to 79.8% in 2011, omitted from the chart so the Muslim and minor-community trends are legible.
Bottom line

Muslims were 14.2% of India's population at the 2011 Census, about one in seven Indians and roughly 17 crore people. That count is now well over a decade old: the Pew Research Center estimated the Muslim share had reached about 15% by 2020 ↗ Pew Research Center, 2021. It is still rising, but slowly, and not because growth is speeding up: Muslim fertility has fallen sharply, steadily narrowing the gap with other communities ↗ Pew Research Center, 2021.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the Muslim share of the population across the six censuses from 1961 to 2011, the last year with hard census data. The next count, Census 2027, is long delayed from the one due in 2021: its population-enumeration phase is set for early 2027, and it will be India's first digital and first caste-counted census since 1931, so a fresh official figure is still some way off ↗ Census 2027 announcement, PIB. The tabs open the detail: By state and By district show how unevenly Muslims are spread, Urban vs rural and By age show a younger, more urban profile, and Population growth shows how the decadal growth rate has fallen.

Why it matters

Population share is the denominator for everything else on this dashboard: it is what every gap on jobs, schooling or representation is measured against. A seventh of the country is large enough that how this group fares shapes India's own development.

About this measurement

Definition. Muslim population as a share of total population at the given geography level.

Methodology. Population shares from the primary RGI Census religion volumes, 1961 to 2011. Two all-India figures exclude a state where the Census could not be held: 1981 excludes Assam and 1991 excludes Jammu & Kashmir. The 2021 Census is delayed.

Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: pop-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Full state data (36 states, 2011)
State / UTMuslim
Mizoram1.4%
Sikkim1.6%
Punjab1.9%
Arunachal Pradesh2.0%
Chhattisgarh2.0%
Odisha2.2%
Himachal Pradesh2.2%
Nagaland2.5%
Dadra & Nagar Haveli3.8%
Meghalaya4.4%
Chandigarh4.9%
Tamil Nadu5.9%
Puducherry6.1%
Madhya Pradesh6.6%
Haryana7.0%
Daman & Diu7.9%
Goa8.3%
Manipur8.4%
Andaman & Nicobar Islands8.5%
Tripura8.6%
Rajasthan9.1%
Andhra Pradesh9.6%
Gujarat9.7%
Maharashtra11.5%
Telangana12.7%
NCT of Delhi12.9%
Karnataka12.9%
Uttarakhand13.9%
Jharkhand14.5%
Bihar16.9%
Uttar Pradesh19.3%
Kerala26.6%
West Bengal27.0%
Assam34.2%
Jammu & Kashmir68.3%
Lakshadweep96.6%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Geographic concentration (top 100 districts)

India had 640 districts in 2011, yet the 100 most Muslim-populous, just 15.6% of them, are home to 58.6% of all Indian Muslims, and the top 10 alone hold 14.0%. This is a geographic-concentration measure, not a community comparison.

#District (ST)Muslims% of district
1Murshidabad (WB)4.71M66.3%
2South Twenty Four Parganas (WB)2.90M35.6%
3Malappuram (KL)2.89M70.2%
4North Twenty Four Parganas (WB)2.58M25.8%
5Moradabad (UP)2.25M47.1%
6Maldah (WB)2.05M51.3%
7Mumbai Suburban (MH)1.80M19.2%
8Hyderabad (AP)1.71M43.5%
9Muzaffarnagar (UP)1.71M41.3%
10Barddhaman (WB)1.60M20.7%
11Bijnor (UP)1.59M43.0%
12Nagaon (AS)1.56M55.4%
13Dhubri (AS)1.55M79.7%
14Bareilly (UP)1.54M34.5%
15Uttar Dinajpur (WB)1.50M49.9%
16Saharanpur (UP)1.45M42.0%
17Nadia (WB)1.38M26.8%
18Katihar (BR)1.37M44.5%
19Thane (MH)1.36M12.3%
20Birbhum (WB)1.30M37.1%
21Haora (WB)1.27M26.2%
22Purnia (BR)1.26M38.5%
23Bangalore (KA)1.25M13.0%
24Kozhikode (KL)1.21M39.2%
25Araria (BR)1.21M43.0%
26Barpeta (AS)1.20M70.7%
27Ghaziabad (UP)1.19M25.4%
28Meerut (UP)1.19M34.4%
29Rampur (UP)1.18M50.6%
30Srinagar (JK)1.18M95.2%
31Bahraich (UP)1.17M33.5%
32Kishanganj (BR)1.15M68.0%
33Anantnag (JK)1.06M98.0%
34Purba Champaran (BR)990k19.4%
35Lucknow (UP)985k21.5%
36Baramula (JK)959k95.2%
37Kolkata (WB)926k20.6%
38Sitapur (UP)894k19.9%
39Ahmadabad (GJ)883k12.2%
40Darbhanga (BR)881k22.4%
41Hugli (WB)870k15.8%
42Pashchim Champaran (BR)865k22.0%
43Mewat (HR)863k79.2%
44Kupwara (JK)823k94.6%
45Madhubani (BR)819k18.3%
46Palakkad (KL)813k28.9%
47Kheri (UP)808k20.1%
48Balrampur (UP)806k37.5%
49Allahabad (UP)797k13.4%
50Budaun (UP)791k21.5%
51Aurangabad (MH)787k21.3%
52Bulandshahr (UP)777k22.2%
53Mumbai (MH)773k25.1%
54Jyotiba Phule Nagar (UP)750k40.8%
55Siddharthnagar (UP)748k29.2%
56Muzaffarpur (BR)746k15.5%
57Purba Medinipur (WB)743k14.6%
58Kannur (KL)742k29.4%
59Sitamarhi (BR)740k21.6%
60Bara Banki (UP)737k22.6%
61Badgam (JK)736k97.7%
62Aligarh (UP)729k19.9%
63Kanpur Nagar (UP)721k15.7%
64Koch Bihar (WB)720k25.5%
65Azamgarh (UP)719k15.6%
66Nashik (MH)693k11.4%
67Karimganj (AS)692k56.4%
68Jaipur (RJ)687k10.4%
69Gonda (UP)679k19.8%
70Pune (MH)674k7.1%
71Kurnool (AP)671k16.6%
72Surat (GJ)661k10.9%
73North East (DL)658k29.3%
74Cachar (AS)655k37.7%
75Sultanpur (UP)650k17.1%
76Hardwar (UK)648k34.3%
77Paschim Medinipur (WB)621k10.5%
78Kushinagar (UP)620k17.4%
79Rangareddy (AP)618k11.7%
80Siwan (BR)608k18.3%
81Kamrup (AS)602k39.7%
82Darrang (AS)597k64.3%
83Goalpara (AS)580k57.5%
84Jalgaon (MH)560k13.3%
85Guntur (AP)560k11.5%
86Hardoi (UP)556k13.6%
87Alwar (RJ)547k14.9%
88Varanasi (UP)547k14.9%
89Bhagalpur (BR)537k17.7%
90Pulwama (JK)535k95.5%
91Thrissur (KL)533k17.1%
92Belgaum (KA)528k11.1%
93Shahjahanpur (UP)528k17.6%
94Bhopal (MP)525k22.2%
95Ernakulam (KL)514k15.7%
96Gulbarga (KA)513k20.0%
97Giridih (JH)509k20.8%
98Kollam (KL)508k19.3%
99Morigaon (AS)503k52.6%
100Dakshina Kannada (KA)502k24.0%

All 640 districts: download CSV

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2011)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim18.2%12.4%
Jain0.9%0.1%
Buddhist1.0%0.6%
Sikh1.6%1.8%
Christian3.0%2.0%
Hindu74.8%82.1%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

By age (2011)

Each line is a community's own age profile, the share of its members in each 10-year band, so communities of very different sizes compare directly. Muslims have the youngest profile: 23.8% are under 10 against 19.3% of Hindus and 13.0% of Jains. Jains, Sikhs and Christians skew oldest.

Age cohortMuslimHinduChristianSikhBuddhistJain
0-923.8%19.3%17.6%15.4%16.9%13.0%
10-1923.5%20.6%19.2%19.3%19.8%15.7%
20-2917.8%17.5%17.1%18.4%19.3%17.2%
30-3913.0%14.6%14.6%14.5%15.2%16.0%
40-499.4%11.4%12.6%12.4%11.6%14.3%
50-595.7%7.5%9.0%8.3%7.6%10.9%
60-694.1%5.5%5.8%6.8%5.8%7.2%
70-791.7%2.4%2.8%3.1%2.7%3.7%
80+0.7%1.0%1.2%1.6%0.9%1.5%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Decadal growth (2001 to 2011)

Between 2001 and 2011 the Muslim population grew 24.6%, faster than Hindu (16.8%) and the all-India 17.7%. The gap reflects higher, now converging, fertility, not migration or conversion.

Community20012011Growth
Muslim13,81,88,24017,22,45,15824.6%
Hindu82,75,78,86896,62,57,35316.8%
Christian2,40,80,0162,78,19,58815.5%
Sikh1,92,15,7302,08,33,1168.4%
Buddhist79,55,20784,42,9726.1%
Jain42,25,05344,51,7535.4%
All1,02,86,10,3281,21,08,54,97717.7%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: · · · ·

What share of each community lives in towns and cities rather than villages.

39.9%(2011)
vs all communities
+8.8pp
higher · 31.1%
vs Hindu
+10.7pp
higher · 29.2%
Bottom line

Two in five Muslims, 39.9%, lived in towns and cities in 2011, well above the 31% national average and the 29% for Hindus. Muslims are one of India's most urban communities, a fact that shapes much of the rest of this dashboard, from their better housing amenities to their concentration in urban informal work.

How to read the chart

The chart compares how urban each community is across the 2001 and 2011 censuses; this is a descriptive fact, not a good or bad outcome. The By state tab shows how much it varies, from highly urban Muslim populations in the south and west to more rural ones in the east.

Why it matters

Whether a community lives in towns or villages colours almost every other measure: urban families have better access to toilets, water and hospitals, but also face the insecure, informal labour markets and segregated neighbourhoods of the city. Muslim urban concentration is the thread running through both their amenity advantages and their job disadvantages.

Status

Contextgap widening

Muslim 39.9% vs Hindu 29.2% in 2011, 10.7pp higher. Muslims have been markedly more urban than Hindus in every recent census, a structural fact that helps explain the housing-amenity inversion elsewhere on this dashboard.

About this measurement

Definition. Percentage of each community living in urban areas. Census Table C-01 provides religion × residence (rural/urban) × sex breakdowns at national, state, district, and town levels; series covers Census 2001 and 2011.

Methodology. Urban share = urban_persons / total_persons * 100, per Census C-01. Two-census series (2001 and 2011) at national and state level; the 2021 Census is delayed. Muslims (~40%) and Christians (~40%) are markedly more urbanised than the all-India average (~31%), a Sachar-era fact that conditions outcomes downstream (urban-poor labour markets, segregation, housing access).

Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: urban-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Full state data (35 states, 2011)
State / UTMuslimHindu
Assam7.5%18.2%
Meghalaya11.8%44.4%
Bihar13.5%10.8%
Himachal Pradesh14.7%9.5%
Tripura14.7%29.2%
Haryana20.0%36.3%
West Bengal22.3%35.8%
Jammu & Kashmir25.8%29.5%
Jharkhand28.1%26.4%
Manipur34.8%45.5%
Uttar Pradesh37.2%18.4%
Uttarakhand43.8%27.9%
Odisha45.0%16.2%
Punjab47.9%58.8%
Rajasthan49.1%21.9%
Kerala52.1%48.5%
Nagaland53.0%63.6%
Andaman & Nicobar Islands53.3%40.5%
Arunachal Pradesh53.8%36.1%
Mizoram55.9%76.1%
Sikkim62.9%26.8%
Karnataka63.5%33.9%
Madhya Pradesh64.7%24.5%
Andhra Pradesh64.9%29.4%
Gujarat65.0%39.5%
Chhattisgarh69.6%22.1%
Maharashtra73.0%39.8%
Dadra & Nagar Haveli73.4%45.4%
Tamil Nadu76.5%45.3%
Lakshadweep77.9%81.9%
Puducherry82.6%66.0%
Goa83.2%59.1%
Daman & Diu86.4%73.9%
Chandigarh97.4%97.3%
NCT of Delhi98.7%97.2%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

Higher means more women relative to men; a low value signals a gender imbalance favouring males.

951females per 1,000 males(2011)

higher is better

vs all communities
+9
ahead · 943
vs Hindu
+12
ahead · 939
among communities
4th of 6
middle tier
Bottom line

There were 951 Muslim women for every 1,000 Muslim men in 2011, a little higher than the 939 for Hindus and the 943 national average. Like the rest of India the Muslim population has fewer women than men, but its ratio has been slightly more balanced than the Hindu one and has improved since 2001.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the number of females per 1,000 males across six censuses since 1961; a value below 1,000 means fewer women than men. Because the interesting range is narrow, the axis sits in an 800 to 1,050 band rather than starting at zero. The By state and Urban vs rural tabs show where the ratio is most and least balanced.

Why it matters

The sex ratio is a quiet signal of how a society values its girls and women, picking up the combined effect of sex selection, female mortality and migration. A ratio closer to balance is generally the healthier sign.

Status

Aheadgap widening

Muslim 951 vs Hindu 939 in 2011, 12 ahead. The Muslim sex ratio has run slightly more balanced than the Hindu one across recent censuses and improved between 2001 and 2011, against the wider Indian pattern of too few women.

About this measurement

Definition. Number of females per 1000 males in the population. A value below 1000 means fewer women than men. Census series across six censuses, 1961-2011.

Methodology. Females / males * 1000 from Census religion tables across six censuses (1961-2011): 1961 Social & Cultural Tables C-VII, the 1971 and 1981 census religion papers, 1991 C-09, 2001 C-01 and 2011 C-15. National for all six years; state-level for 2001 and 2011. Two all-India figures exclude a state where the Census could not be held: 1981 excludes Assam and 1991 excludes Jammu & Kashmir.

The 2021 Census is delayed.

Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: sex-ratio.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Full state data (35 states, 2011)
State / UTMuslimHindu
Sikkim510856
Mizoram553506
Dadra & Nagar Haveli678774
Daman & Diu699607
Nagaland716651
Chandigarh721803
Arunachal Pradesh739785
NCT of Delhi855865
Himachal Pradesh856975
Punjab862879
Andaman & Nicobar Islands874858
Haryana895876
Uttarakhand901976
Goa905929
Maharashtra911928
Meghalaya923863
Jammu & Kashmir935795
Uttar Pradesh937907
Bihar941913
Jharkhand943935
Gujarat944916
Madhya Pradesh945929
Rajasthan946927
West Bengal951948
Chhattisgarh952990
Assam955958
Odisha956977
Tripura964959
Karnataka969972
Andhra Pradesh978993
Manipur992982
Lakshadweep998115
Tamil Nadu1015992
Puducherry10731030
Kerala11251077

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2011)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim942958
Sikh898905
Jain959935
Hindu921947
Buddhist973960
Christian10461008
Other10071009
All communities929949

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 1961 · C-VII Religion · Census 1971 · Paper 2 of 1972 · Census 1981 · HH-15 (Paper 3 of 1984) · Census 1991 · C-9 Religion · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: ·

Health & Housing

Lower infant mortality and the lowest anaemia of any community, but the highest under-5 stunting; basic amenities (toilets, water, electricity, pucca homes) at or above par.

Of recent live births, what share took place at a hospital or health facility rather than at home.

84.3%of births in a facility(2020)

higher is better

vs all communities
-7.4pp
behind · 91.7%
vs Hindu
-5.2pp
behind · 89.5%
among communities
5th of 6
bottom tier
Bottom line

Muslim institutional deliveries have surged from under a third of births in 1998 to 84.3% in 2019-21, one of the fastest gains on the dashboard. Hindus are at 89.5% and the national average 88.6%, so a gap remains, but most Muslim births now happen in a hospital or clinic rather than at home.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the share of births in a health facility for each community across four National Family Health Surveys from 1998 to 2019-21; rising is better, and every line climbs steeply. The distance between Muslims and the better-served communities is the point, so the vertical axis does not start at zero.

Why it matters

A trained attendant and emergency care at birth are the single biggest protection against a mother or newborn dying. The shift from home to facility birth is the main reason maternal and newborn deaths have fallen so fast.

Status

Behindgap widening

Muslim 84.3% vs Hindu 89.5% in 2020, 5.2pp behind. The gap with Hindus widened during the mid-2000s, as better-off communities scaled up first, then began closing again after 2015 as cash incentives like Janani Suraksha Yojana reached further.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

Key levers

Key stakeholders
  • Ministry of Health and Family Welfare: The Union ministry responsible for India's health policy and its family-planning, maternal-health and child-health programmes.
  • National Health Mission: The Government of India's flagship health programme, working toward affordable, quality care including maternal, newborn and child health services across rural and urban India.
  • Aga Khan Health Services, India: The Aga Khan network's Indian health arm, running maternal and child health services including a maternal and child care centre in Hyderabad and rural reproductive, child-health and nutrition work. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • SEWA Rural Credibility Alliance accredited: A voluntary organisation in tribal south Gujarat whose Kasturba Hospital and community programmes deliver maternal and newborn care, with large reported falls in maternal and neonatal deaths in its area. Donate
  • Doctors For You GiveIndia vetted: A humanitarian health NGO providing rural maternal and child health, treatment of severe acute malnutrition and disaster medical care across several states. Donate
  • Jhpiego India: A Johns Hopkins-affiliated non-profit that strengthens maternal and newborn care in India by training frontline health workers and supporting government programmes. Donate
  • UNICEF India: The UN Children's Fund's India office, working with states on child survival, immunisation and maternal and newborn health.
  • International Institute for Population Sciences: The Mumbai institute that conducts the National Family Health Survey, the source of India's infant-mortality and maternal and child health figures by population group.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Percentage of live births in the years preceding each survey round that took place in a health facility (public or private), among women age 15-49.

Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 8.13 (page 324); the "all" value is a sample-size-weighted average of the 7 religion rates (the published Total row was hard to extract cleanly from the dual-column PDF layout) and matches NFHS-5's published 88.6% within rounding. Earlier rounds come from each report's facility-delivery religion table; every canonical row's methodology_note records its exact source.

Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99). Download CSV: inst-delivery.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Of every 1,000 babies born, how many die before their first birthday.

33.0deaths per 1,000 live births(2020)

lower is better

vs all communities
+4.6
behind · 28.4
vs Hindu
-2.4
ahead · 35.4
among communities
4th of 5
bottom tier
Bottom line

Muslims have lower infant mortality than Hindus, and have done so in every national survey since the 1990s, despite being poorer on most other measures. In the latest survey, 2019-21, about 33 Muslim infants died before their first birthday for every 1,000 born, against 35 among Hindus. This Muslim survival advantage is real but shrinking, as mortality has fallen faster among other communities.

How to read the chart

The main chart tracks infant deaths per 1,000 live births for each community across four National Family Health Surveys from 1998 to 2019-21; here a falling line is good news, since lower is better. Every community's line drops steeply, so the chart shows both the broad decline and the narrowing distance between communities. The Urban vs rural tab splits each rate into town and village, where most infant deaths still happen, and shows the Muslim advantage is largely a rural one.

Why it matters

Infant mortality is one of the most sensitive measures of a population's living conditions, capturing the combined effect of nutrition, sanitation, maternal health and access to care in the first, most fragile year of life. That Muslims do better here than richer communities is one of the most studied puzzles in Indian demography, and a reminder that income alone does not determine survival.

Status

Aheadgap narrowing

Muslim 33.0 vs Hindu 35.4 in 2020, 2.4 ahead. Muslims have recorded lower infant mortality than Hindus in every survey since 1998, but the advantage has shrunk from roughly 18 points then to about 2 today as mortality fell faster among other communities.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Sanitation · Muslim neighbourhoods practise less open defecation, and this local difference alone accounts for a large share of the survival gap, an effect that protects Hindu neighbours too ↗ Geruso and Spears, 2018.
  • Maternal health · The part researchers can explain comes mainly from mothers' height and diet, not the breastfeeding or birth-spacing stories often repeated in the press ↗ Bhalotra, Valente and van Soest, 2010.
  • Still a puzzle · After income, education and the usual risk factors are accounted for, those predict Muslims should fare worse, not better, so most of the advantage stays unexplained ↗ Bhalotra, Valente and van Soest, 2010.

Key levers

  • Sanitation for all · The gain tied most directly to infant survival; it saves lives everywhere and erodes the Muslim edge as open defecation falls ↗ Geruso and Spears, 2018.
  • Maternal and newborn care · The National Health Mission's immunisation, institutional delivery and newborn care is the main public instrument.
  • Stick to the basics · Because the advantage itself is mostly unexplained, the surest gains come from what helps every infant, not from trying to bottle what Muslim households are doing right ↗ Bhalotra, Valente and van Soest, 2010.
Key stakeholders
  • Ministry of Health and Family Welfare: The Union ministry responsible for India's health policy and its family-planning, maternal-health and child-health programmes.
  • National Health Mission: The Government of India's flagship health programme, working toward affordable, quality care including maternal, newborn and child health services across rural and urban India.
  • Aga Khan Health Services, India: The Aga Khan network's Indian health arm, running maternal and child health services including a maternal and child care centre in Hyderabad and rural reproductive, child-health and nutrition work. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • SEWA Rural Credibility Alliance accredited: A voluntary organisation in tribal south Gujarat whose Kasturba Hospital and community programmes deliver maternal and newborn care, with large reported falls in maternal and neonatal deaths in its area. Donate
  • Doctors For You GiveIndia vetted: A humanitarian health NGO providing rural maternal and child health, treatment of severe acute malnutrition and disaster medical care across several states. Donate
  • Jhpiego India: A Johns Hopkins-affiliated non-profit that strengthens maternal and newborn care in India by training frontline health workers and supporting government programmes. Donate
  • UNICEF India: The UN Children's Fund's India office, working with states on child survival, immunisation and maternal and newborn health.
  • International Institute for Population Sciences: The Mumbai institute that conducts the National Family Health Survey, the source of India's infant-mortality and maternal and child health figures by population group.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Probability of dying before the first birthday, expressed per 1000 live births, for the period preceding each survey round.

Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 7.2 publishes URBAN and RURAL IMR by religion separately with no total-residence-by-religion column, so the national total is a population-weighted average using Census 2011 urban/rural population by religion as weights (<1% drift; urban/rural shares by religion are stable). Earlier rounds come from each report's religion table; every canonical row's methodology_note records its exact source.

Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99) · Census 2011 · C-series. Download CSV: imr.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2020)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim27.836.5
Buddhist16.224.6
Other21.931.5
Sikh19.631.9
Christian12.633.7
Hindu26.938.9
All communities26.638.4

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

Of children under 5, what share is too short for their age, a long-term sign of chronic undernutrition.

36.8%(2020)

lower is better

vs all communities
+1.3pp
behind · 35.5%
vs Hindu
+1.3pp
behind · 35.5%
among communities
6th of 6
bottom tier
Bottom line

In 2019-21, 36.8% of Muslim children under five were stunted, too short for their age from chronic undernutrition, just above Hindus at 35.5% and the national 35.5%. It is a striking counterpoint to infant mortality, where Muslim children do better: they are more likely to survive infancy, yet slightly more likely to grow up stunted.

How to read the chart

The chart compares the share of under-five children who are stunted across communities for 2019-21, the latest National Family Health Survey; here lower is better. Stunting builds up over the whole of early childhood rather than at a single moment, so it shifts slowly.

Why it matters

Stunting in the first years is largely irreversible and predicts weaker school performance, lower adult earnings and poorer health for life. It is one of the clearest early signs of how poverty passes to the next generation.

Status

Behind

Muslim 36.8% vs Hindu 35.5% in 2020, 1.3pp behind. The Muslim figure sits just above the Hindu one, but both are far above the levels seen for Christian, Sikh and Jain children, a sign that this is a poverty gap more than a community one.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Poverty · Stunting tracks household poverty closely, and Muslims are over-represented among the poor and the urban informal workforce ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Maternal health · An undernourished, anaemic mother bears a child who starts growth behind, and these conditions run high in poorer homes ↗ NFHS-5 India report, 2019-21.
  • Diet quality · Tight budgets mean less diverse, protein-poor diets in the first two years, exactly when stunting sets in ↗ NFHS-5 India report, 2019-21.

Key levers

  • The first 1,000 days · Stunting is prevented from pregnancy to age two; the Anganwadi and ICDS nutrition system is the main public instrument.
  • Maternal nutrition · Treating anaemia and undernutrition in mothers protects the child's early growth ↗ NFHS-5 India report, 2019-21.
  • Reach poor urban Muslims · Target the dense, informal-work neighbourhoods where Muslim children and nutrition services are most mismatched ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
Key stakeholders
  • Ministry of Women and Child Development: The Union ministry that runs Poshan Abhiyaan and the Anganwadi and ICDS system, India's main effort to cut stunting and undernutrition in young children, pregnant women and mothers.
  • National Health Mission: The Government of India's flagship health programme, covering maternal, newborn and child health services across rural and urban India.
  • Aga Khan Health Services, India: The Aga Khan network's Indian health arm, whose child-health work includes infant-feeding and nutrition programmes. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • The Antara Foundation: An NGO that strengthens India's frontline nutrition system, supporting Anganwadi and ASHA workers to improve maternal and under-five nutrition.
  • Doctors For You GiveIndia vetted: A humanitarian health NGO whose work includes treatment of severe acute malnutrition in children, alongside rural maternal and child health. Donate
  • SEWA Rural Credibility Alliance accredited: A voluntary organisation in tribal south Gujarat whose hospital and community programmes deliver maternal, newborn and child nutrition care. Donate
  • UNICEF India: The UN Children's Fund's India office, which works with states on child nutrition, survival and immunisation.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Percentage of children under age 5 classified as stunted (height-for-age more than 2 SD below the WHO Child Growth Standards median). Stunting indicates chronic malnutrition in early life.

Methodology. NFHS-5 (2019-21) Table 10.1 (Nutritional status of children by background characteristics). Religion column = % below -2 SD HFA; all-India value is the sample-size-weighted average of the 6 religion rows (reproduces the published national rate of 35.5%). Single round in canonical for now; NFHS-2/3/4 extension possible (same pattern as IMR / inst-delivery / anaemia trend extractors).

Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21). Download CSV: stunting-u5.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Of women in childbearing age (15 to 49), what share has anaemia (low haemoglobin).

55.6%of women age 15-49(2020)

lower is better

vs all communities
-0.9pp
ahead · 56.5%
vs Hindu
-1.8pp
ahead · 57.4%
among communities
3rd of 6
middle tier
Bottom line

More than half of Muslim women aged 15 to 49, 55.6%, were anaemic in 2019-21, marginally better than Hindu women at 57.4% and the national 57.0%. The small Muslim edge is real and long-standing, but the headline is grim for everyone: anaemia is extremely common across all communities and has risen since the last survey.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the share of women who are anaemic across four National Family Health Surveys; lower is better, but notice how little the lines separate and how most tick upward after 2015. The Muslim line sits just below the Hindu one throughout.

Why it matters

Anaemia saps energy and learning, raises the risk of death in childbirth, and passes low iron to the next child. At over half of all women, it is one of India's largest and most stubborn public-health failures.

Status

Aheadgap narrowing

Muslim 55.6% vs Hindu 57.4% in 2020, 1.8pp ahead. The Muslim advantage is small and, like every community's, moving the wrong way: anaemia rose between 2015 and 2019-21 despite a national supplementation programme.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Diet · The main reason Muslim women fare slightly better is more frequent iron-rich non-vegetarian food, which the National Family Health Survey records as higher among Muslims ↗ NFHS-5 India report, 2019-21.
  • A small edge on a huge problem · The gap between communities is tiny next to the gap between India and the rest of the world: cereal-heavy diets, early and frequent childbearing and poor iron absorption keep every group above half ↗ NFHS-5 India report, 2019-21.

Key levers

  • Iron and folic acid · Universal supplementation through the Anaemia Mukt Bharat programme is the main instrument, though uptake and absorption stay weak.
  • Dietary diversity · More iron-rich food, with vitamin C to absorb it, helps every community rather than one.
  • Spaced pregnancies · Fewer and better-spaced births let a woman's iron stores recover.
Key stakeholders
  • Ministry of Health and Family Welfare: The Union ministry responsible for India's health policy and its family-planning, maternal-health and child-health programmes.
  • National Health Mission: The Government of India's flagship health programme, working toward affordable, quality care including maternal, newborn and child health services across rural and urban India.
  • Aga Khan Health Services, India: The Aga Khan network's Indian health arm, running maternal and child health services including a maternal and child care centre in Hyderabad and rural reproductive, child-health and nutrition work. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • SEWA Rural Credibility Alliance accredited: A voluntary organisation in tribal south Gujarat whose Kasturba Hospital and community programmes deliver maternal and newborn care, with large reported falls in maternal and neonatal deaths in its area. Donate
  • Doctors For You GiveIndia vetted: A humanitarian health NGO providing rural maternal and child health, treatment of severe acute malnutrition and disaster medical care across several states. Donate
  • Jhpiego India: A Johns Hopkins-affiliated non-profit that strengthens maternal and newborn care in India by training frontline health workers and supporting government programmes. Donate
  • UNICEF India: The UN Children's Fund's India office, working with states on child survival, immunisation and maternal and newborn health.
  • International Institute for Population Sciences: The Mumbai institute that conducts the National Family Health Survey, the source of India's infant-mortality and maternal and child health figures by population group.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Percentage of women age 15-49 with any anaemia, defined as haemoglobin <12.0 g/dl (non-pregnant) or <11.0 g/dl (pregnant), altitude-adjusted.

Methodology. Time series across four NFHS rounds: NFHS-2 (1998-99), NFHS-3 (2005-06), NFHS-4 (2015-16) and NFHS-5 (2019-21); years 1998/2005/2015/2020 are the round labels. For NFHS-5, Table 10.23.1 reports total-residence women's anaemia by religion directly. NFHS changed anaemia measurement between NFHS-4 and NFHS-5 (capillary vs venous blood at the same Hb <12.0 g/dl cut-off), which breaks cross-round comparability, so the three pre-NFHS-5 rounds carry break_flag=true: do not read the 2015 -> 2020 step as a pure trend.

Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21) · NFHS-4 (2015-16) · NFHS-3 (2005-06) · NFHS-2 (1998-99). Download CSV: women-anemia.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

What a household pays from its own pocket for one hospital admission, after any insurance or employer reimbursement: doctor's fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges. Childbirth stays are excluded. Muslim hospital stays cost less on average, for two reasons: more Muslim patients use government hospitals, where a stay costs a fraction of what a private hospital charges, and Muslim households have less to spend on private care. Spending less does not mean getting the same care for less money.

INR 30,104out of pocket per admission, excl. childbirth(2025)
vs all communities
-INR 3,960
lower · INR 34,064
vs Hindu
-INR 4,219
lower · INR 34,323
Bottom line

When a Muslim household has someone admitted to hospital, it pays about INR 30,104 from its own pocket, against INR 34,323 in a Hindu household. A lower bill is not good news here: it mostly reflects greater reliance on cheaper government hospitals, which in turn tracks lower incomes, rather than cheaper or better care.

How to read the chart

The chart compares out-of-pocket spending per hospital admission across communities for 2017 and 2025; childbirth is excluded, and lower is not automatically better. The Urban vs rural tab shows costs are higher in towns, where private hospitals dominate.

Why it matters

A single hospital admission is one of the commonest ways an Indian family slides into debt or poverty. What a household pays, and whether it can lean on a public hospital, says a lot about both its income and its exposure to a medical shock.

Status

Contextgap widening

Muslim INR 30,104 vs Hindu INR 34,323 in 2025, INR 4,219 lower. The gap has widened in rupee terms as all costs rose, consistent with Muslim households staying more dependent on the public system as private care grew dearer.

About this measurement

Definition. What a household pays from its own pocket for one hospital admission, after any insurance or employer reimbursement: doctor's fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges. Childbirth stays are excluded. A lower figure does not mean cheaper care: it mostly shows who uses government hospitals and who can afford private ones.

Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of two NSS Household Social Consumption: Health rounds: the 75th (Sch 25.0, July 2017 - June 2018, 1.14 lakh households, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes) and the 80th (January - December 2025, 1.40 lakh households, via the NADA CSV distribution). Out-of-pocket medical expenditure per hospitalisation case excluding childbirth is the 2025 release's own headline construct, computed identically in both rounds: medical expenditure (fees, medicines, diagnostics, bed and package charges; transport and food excluded) minus any insurance or employer reimbursement, averaged over cases of the last 365 days. The 2017-18 estimator reproduces all nine published cells of NSS Report 586 Statement 3.15 within 0.01% and the published reimbursement shares exactly; the 2025 estimator reproduces all six press-note OOPME cells within 0.01%.

Neither publication breaks expenditure down by religion. A Muslim hospital stay cost INR 30,104 against the all-India INR 34,064 in 2025 (Hindu INR 34,323), and INR 14,827 against 18,088 in 2017-18: about 12-19% less per stay. Muslims lean more on government hospitals (41.5% of Muslim hospitalisation cases in 2025 against 36.4% of Hindu cases, down from 47.6% and 41.8% in 2017-18), where the average bill runs about an eighth of a private one, and lower spending capacity does the rest; the survey cannot tell cheaper care apart from care that was needed but never bought.

Values are nominal rupees of each round; health insurance coverage roughly tripled between the rounds, so the netted reimbursement matters more in 2025. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, not religions, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates.

Where this data comes from. NSS Health 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.0 Health (2017-18). Download CSV: hospital-oop-spend.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2025)
CommunityUrbanRural
MuslimINR 31,423INR 29,189
HinduINR 39,468INR 31,588
ChristianINR 45,115INR 34,281
SikhINR 37,408INR 40,004
All communitiesINR 38,688INR 31,484

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS Health 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.0 Health (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

What share of households has a toilet of any type.

90.3%of households(2020)

higher is better

vs all communities
+7.8pp
ahead · 82.5%
vs Hindu
+9.6pp
ahead · 80.7%
among communities
4th of 6
middle tier
Bottom line

Nine in ten Muslim households had a toilet in 2020, at 90.3%, almost ten points above Hindus at 80.7%. This is one of a cluster of housing measures, toilets, water and electricity, where Muslims sit at or above the national level, a pattern that runs against the gaps on income and education.

How to read the chart

The chart compares the share of households with a toilet across communities for 2019-21; higher is better. The Urban vs rural tab matters here: access is higher in towns for every community, and part of the Muslim lead comes from being a more urban community.

Why it matters

A household toilet is one of the strongest protections a child has: where neighbourhoods stop open defecation, fewer infants die and fewer children are stunted. This is the same sanitation advantage that helps explain why Muslim infants survive at higher rates.

Status

Ahead

Muslim 90.3% vs Hindu 80.7% in 2020, 9.6pp ahead. The Muslim lead on toilets holds across the country and connects directly to the community's better infant survival, where local sanitation is the best-evidenced cause.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Urban living · Muslims are more urban than average, and towns have far higher toilet coverage than villages ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Less open defecation · Muslim neighbourhoods practise less open defecation than Hindu ones at the same income, a difference researchers tie to both norms and density ↗ Geruso and Spears, 2018.
  • Compact settlements · Dense, often walled urban settlement makes a household latrine both more usual and more necessary.

Key levers

  • Universal coverage · Swachh Bharat has pushed toilet access up for everyone; the unfinished task is the poorest rural households of every community.
  • Use, not just build · The lasting gain is in sustained use and maintenance, not just construction.
  • Water to match · A toilet needs water to work, which links this directly to the drinking-water push.
Key stakeholders
  • Swachh Bharat Mission (Grameen): The national rural sanitation programme, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, that built over ten crore household toilets to make villages free of open defecation.
  • Jal Jeevan Mission: The Ministry of Jal Shakti mission to provide a safe piped drinking water connection to every rural household, with source sustainability and community management.
  • Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Gramin): The Ministry of Rural Development scheme that helps houseless families and those in kutcha homes build a pucca house with basic amenities.
  • Aga Khan Agency for Habitat, India: The Aga Khan network's habitat agency, building water security, sanitation, low-cost housing and disaster resilience in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Telangana. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • Human Welfare Foundation: A development NGO whose community work includes drinking-water and shelter projects for deprived families in disadvantaged, largely minority areas. Donate
  • WaterAid India 80G + FCRA: A water and sanitation NGO working since 1986 across about 1,200 villages in ten states to make clean water, decent toilets and good hygiene reach the poorest. Donate
  • Habitat for Humanity India 80G + FCRA: A housing NGO that provides decent, affordable homes and sanitation to low-income and marginalised families and helps disaster-hit families rebuild. Donate
  • Sulabh International: India's pioneering sanitation movement, which has built over sixteen lakh household toilets and ten thousand public toilet complexes and works to rehabilitate manual scavengers.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Share of households with access to a toilet of any type.

Methodology. NFHS-5 Table 2.4 (page 74). Total residence, national. Year=2020 = NFHS-5 fieldwork midpoint.

Muslim toilet access (90.3%) runs *above* Hindu (80.7%), partly because urban-Muslim share is higher than urban-Hindu share, and urban access is uniformly higher. Not strictly "improved sanitation" per the WHO/UNICEF JMP definition: the published NFHS-5 table aggregates flush, pit and other toilet types.

Where this data comes from. NFHS-5 (2019-21). Download CSV: improved-sanitation.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2020)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim97.2%85.4%
Other95.5%66.2%
Hindu95.1%74.0%
Buddhist95.3%82.8%
Christian97.5%87.2%
Jain99.9%88.1%
Sikh99.3%96.7%
All communities95.6%76.0%

Read Reproduce this view. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Source: NFHS-5 (2019-21). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

What share of households gets its drinking water from an improved source located within its own premises, so nobody has to fetch water from outside. Muslim households are ahead of Hindu households here, driven by a rural advantage.

69.3%of households(2018)

higher is better

vs all communities
+5.7pp
ahead · 63.6%
vs Hindu
+6.8pp
ahead · 62.5%
among communities
2nd of 4
middle tier
Bottom line

About 69% of Muslim households had drinking water on their own premises in 2018, so no one had to walk to fetch it, against 63% of Hindu households. Like toilets, this is a measure where Muslims sit a little above the national level, helped by being a more urban community.

How to read the chart

The chart compares the share of households with an improved water source on their own premises across communities for 2018; higher is better, because it means no daily walk to fetch water. The Urban vs rural tab splits the two.

Why it matters

Water on the premises saves hours of fetching, almost always women's and girls' time, and cuts the contamination that comes with carrying and storing water. It feeds straight into health, school attendance and the time women have for paid work.

Status

Ahead

Muslim 69.3% vs Hindu 62.5% in 2018, 6.8pp ahead. The Muslim edge on water, like sanitation, owes much to urban concentration, and it sits within a wider picture where the basic-amenities story runs opposite to the income story.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Urban living · Piped, on-premises water is far more common in towns, where Muslims are over-represented ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Dense settlement · Compact urban neighbourhoods are cheaper to connect to a piped network than scattered rural homes.
  • Public schemes · Expanding piped-water schemes have reached urban and, more recently, rural homes across communities.

Key levers

  • Jal Jeevan Mission · The rural piped-water push is the main lever to extend on-premises water to the households still without it.
  • Urban equity · The remaining urban gaps are in informal settlements, which need targeted connections.
  • Source sustainability · A tap helps only if the source lasts, the harder long-term task.
Key stakeholders
  • Swachh Bharat Mission (Grameen): The national rural sanitation programme, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, that built over ten crore household toilets to make villages free of open defecation.
  • Jal Jeevan Mission: The Ministry of Jal Shakti mission to provide a safe piped drinking water connection to every rural household, with source sustainability and community management.
  • Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Gramin): The Ministry of Rural Development scheme that helps houseless families and those in kutcha homes build a pucca house with basic amenities.
  • Aga Khan Agency for Habitat, India: The Aga Khan network's habitat agency, building water security, sanitation, low-cost housing and disaster resilience in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Telangana. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • Human Welfare Foundation: A development NGO whose community work includes drinking-water and shelter projects for deprived families in disadvantaged, largely minority areas. Donate
  • WaterAid India 80G + FCRA: A water and sanitation NGO working since 1986 across about 1,200 villages in ten states to make clean water, decent toilets and good hygiene reach the poorest. Donate
  • Habitat for Humanity India 80G + FCRA: A housing NGO that provides decent, affordable homes and sanitation to low-income and marginalised families and helps disaster-hit families rebuild. Donate
  • Sulabh International: India's pioneering sanitation movement, which has built over sixteen lakh household toilets and ten thousand public toilet complexes and works to rehabilitate manual scavengers.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Share of households whose main source of drinking water is an improved source (piped, tubewell, protected well, bottled and similar) located within the household's own premises, so no one has to fetch water from outside.

Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of NSS 76th round Schedule 1.2 (Drinking Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Housing Condition, Jul-Dec 2018; 1.07 lakh households): improved principal source located within premises, by religion of household head, weighted. Report 584 publishes this by state and social group, never religion. The extraction reproduces the published all-India values across 24 validation cells to a worst gap of 0.24 points (improved-within-premises all-India: 63.6 computed vs 63.8 published, the strictest blank-distance treatment).

Muslim households are AHEAD of Hindu households here (69.3% vs 62.5%), driven by a rural advantage (65.9 vs 54.3); urban Muslims trail urban Hindus on piped-into-dwelling water (36.5% vs 41.4%, in the data file). Unit data: the original mospi.gov.in TXT distribution (the current NADA catalog ships only a proprietary binary; re-fetch URLs + sha256 in sources/nss76/). NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported; the split is indicative; no sub-state estimates.

Year=2018 = survey period.

Where this data comes from. NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Download CSV: improved-water-premises.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Urban vs rural (2018)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim74.6%65.9%
Christian70.0%40.5%
Hindu79.0%54.3%
Sikh93.6%89.5%
All communities78.4%55.9%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

What share of households lives in a pucca house, with walls and roof of permanent materials like brick, concrete or stone. The standard Indian measure of housing quality.

83.6%in permanent-material homes(2018)

higher is better

vs all communities
+0.3pp
ahead · 83.3%
vs Hindu
+0.3pp
ahead · 83.3%
among communities
2nd of 4
middle tier
Bottom line

About 84% of Muslim households lived in a pucca, permanent-material home in 2018, essentially the same as Hindus at 83%. On the basic quality of the roof over their heads the two communities are level, another amenity where the usual gap does not appear.

How to read the chart

The chart compares the share of households in a pucca (permanent-material) home across communities for 2018; higher is better. The Electricity tab carries a closely related amenity, and Urban vs rural splits the rate by place, where pucca housing is near-universal in towns.

Why it matters

A pucca home of brick or concrete withstands monsoon, heat and fire far better than a kutcha one of mud or thatch, and is the base for everything from health to a child's place to study. It is the most basic marker of housing security.

Status

At parity

Muslim 83.6% vs Hindu 83.3% in 2018, about level. On housing structure Muslims and Hindus are level, and both sit near the national average; the gaps in this cluster are between town and village, not between communities.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • A shared floor · Pucca housing has become near-universal in towns for every community, so urban Muslims and Hindus look alike ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Housing schemes · Decades of rural and urban housing programmes have lifted permanent-material homes across the board.
  • Self-build first · Households of all communities invest first in a solid house, often the single largest asset they ever build.

Key levers

  • Reach the last kutcha homes · The remaining gap is the poorest rural households of every community, the target of the housing schemes.
  • Quality, not just walls · A pucca label can still hide crowding and poor ventilation worth improving.
  • Tenure security · Secure land title is what lets the urban poor invest in a permanent home.
Key stakeholders
  • Swachh Bharat Mission (Grameen): The national rural sanitation programme, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, that built over ten crore household toilets to make villages free of open defecation.
  • Jal Jeevan Mission: The Ministry of Jal Shakti mission to provide a safe piped drinking water connection to every rural household, with source sustainability and community management.
  • Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Gramin): The Ministry of Rural Development scheme that helps houseless families and those in kutcha homes build a pucca house with basic amenities.
  • Aga Khan Agency for Habitat, India: The Aga Khan network's habitat agency, building water security, sanitation, low-cost housing and disaster resilience in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Telangana. Founded by the Ismaili community, it serves all communities.
  • Human Welfare Foundation: A development NGO whose community work includes drinking-water and shelter projects for deprived families in disadvantaged, largely minority areas. Donate
  • WaterAid India 80G + FCRA: A water and sanitation NGO working since 1986 across about 1,200 villages in ten states to make clean water, decent toilets and good hygiene reach the poorest. Donate
  • Habitat for Humanity India 80G + FCRA: A housing NGO that provides decent, affordable homes and sanitation to low-income and marginalised families and helps disaster-hit families rebuild. Donate
  • Sulabh International: India's pioneering sanitation movement, which has built over sixteen lakh household toilets and ten thousand public toilet complexes and works to rehabilitate manual scavengers.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Share of households living in a pucca structure: walls and roof both made of permanent materials (brick, concrete, stone, metal and similar), the standard Indian measure of housing quality.

Methodology. Computed from NSS 76th round Schedule 1.2 unit-level microdata (Jul-Dec 2018), by religion of household head, weighted; reproduces the published all-India values (76.7 rural / 96.0 urban / 83.3 all) exactly. Muslim 83.6% vs Hindu 83.3%: parity overall, with rural Muslims slightly behind rural Hindus (75.9 vs 76.8) offset by the community's higher urban share. Same source, validation and caveats as the water card (see sources/nss76/); religion is self-reported per the NSO rider; year=2018 = survey period.

The "Electricity" tab folds in the companion measure from the same Schedule 1.2 microdata (the decarded household-electricity metric, reproducing the published 93.9 rural / 99.1 urban / 95.7 all exactly): Muslim 96.6% vs Hindu 95.4%, near-parity by 2018 with the small Muslim edge from the community's higher urban share.

Where this data comes from. NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Download CSV: pucca-house.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Electricity (2018)

Share of households with electricity for domestic use, from the same NSS 76th round survey as the pucca-housing chart. Near-universal by 2018 and close to parity: Muslim households at 96.6% against Hindu 95.4% and all-India 95.7%, the small Muslim edge riding on the community's higher urban share.

CommunityOverallUrbanRural
Muslim96.6%98.8%95.2%
Sikh99.7%100.0%99.6%
Christian97.5%99.2%96.5%
Hindu95.4%99.2%93.6%
All communities95.7%99.1%93.9%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2018)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim95.7%75.9%
Christian92.6%71.1%
Hindu96.2%76.8%
Sikh99.4%96.0%
All communities96.0%76.7%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 76th 1.2 (2018). Each value is computed from the data file; every row records its own source and method.

More views: ·

Education, work & income

Behind on literacy, higher education, salaried jobs, pay and household wealth; workforce participation near par, with the gap widest in cities.

Of people aged 7 and older, what share can read and write. The Census uses 7+ as the standard cutoff to exclude very young children.

68.6%can read and write, age 7+(2011)

higher is better

vs all communities
-4.4pp
behind · 73.0%
vs Hindu
-4.7pp
behind · 73.3%
among communities
6th of 6
bottom tier
Bottom line

Just under 69% of Muslims aged 7 and above could read and write in 2011, the lowest literacy rate among India's larger religious communities and about five points behind Hindus. The gap has been narrowing slowly since 2001, but literacy stays lowest for Muslim women and in rural areas, where barely three in five Muslims are literate.

How to read the chart

The main chart tracks literacy for each community across the 2001 and 2011 censuses, with Muslims in maroon and the all-India average as the dashed line; a rising line means literacy is improving. Because the distance between communities is the point, the vertical axis does not start at zero. The tabs break the same measure down further: By state shows how far the Muslim rate swings across India, By sex exposes the wide gap between Muslim men and women, and Urban vs rural shows how much lower literacy runs in Muslim villages than in Muslim towns.

Why it matters

Literacy is the floor every other opportunity stands on. It shapes access to formal jobs, government services and scholarships, and a household's ability to handle paperwork, health information and its own legal rights. A community that starts behind on literacy tends to stay behind on income, formal work and schooling in the generation that follows.

Status

Behindgap narrowing

Muslim 68.6% vs Hindu 73.3% in 2011, 4.7pp behind. The gap has closed by a little over a point since 2001, slow but steady progress, and literacy remains lowest for Muslim women and in rural areas.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Poverty · Muslims are disproportionately poor and concentrated in informal urban work, so children are pulled toward earning rather than staying in school ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • School access · The Sachar Committee found too few schools in many Muslim-majority localities, leaving children further from a classroom ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Early dropout · Muslims had the highest school dropout rate of any large community, most leaving around the move from primary to secondary ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • The female gap · Literacy is lowest of all for Muslim women, so half the community starts furthest behind, and a mother's literacy shapes the next generation.
  • Patchy delivery · The 2014 Post-Sachar review found remedial schemes existed on paper but reached Muslim children unevenly, so gaps persisted through weak delivery as much as missing policy ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.

Key levers

  • Deliver existing aid · The Pre-Matric, Post-Matric and Merit-cum-Means scholarships already exist; the Post-Sachar priority is consistent delivery, not new schemes ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.
  • Stop early dropout · Target the primary-to-secondary transition, where Muslim dropout is highest ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Prioritise girls · Close the female literacy gap, the widest single sub-gap within the community.
  • Back minority schools · Protect and strengthen Article 30 minority institutions through the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Share of population aged 7 and above who can both read and write with understanding in any language.

Methodology. Census defines literacy as the ability to read and write with understanding in any language. Two-census series (2001 and 2011, Census C-09 education-by-religion tables); both rounds share the same Census definition, so the 2001 -> 2011 change is a like-for-like comparison. PLFS reports a broadly similar literacy measure on a slightly different definition and is a possible future cross-check; no PLFS series is plotted here today.

Where this data comes from. Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Download CSV: lit-7plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Full state data (35 states, 2011)
State / UTMuslimHindu
Haryana53.4%77.1%
Meghalaya54.0%77.2%
Bihar56.4%62.9%
Nagaland57.9%80.0%
Uttar Pradesh58.8%69.7%
Jammu & Kashmir61.0%79.1%
Punjab61.9%80.1%
Assam61.9%77.7%
Rajasthan62.7%66.1%
Uttarakhand63.2%81.2%
Jharkhand66.2%67.7%
Himachal Pradesh67.5%83.1%
Arunachal Pradesh67.7%70.1%
Manipur67.8%82.0%
West Bengal68.8%79.1%
Andhra Pradesh73.6%66.1%
Chandigarh74.7%85.2%
Madhya Pradesh74.9%68.6%
NCT of Delhi75.6%87.3%
Sikkim76.6%82.0%
Mizoram77.8%91.8%
Karnataka78.9%74.4%
Odisha80.0%73.2%
Gujarat80.8%77.5%
Tripura83.2%88.2%
Maharashtra83.6%81.8%
Chhattisgarh84.6%69.8%
Goa84.7%88.7%
Daman & Diu85.9%87.1%
Dadra & Nagar Haveli86.6%75.6%
Tamil Nadu88.2%78.8%
Andaman & Nicobar Islands91.5%87.0%
Puducherry91.7%85.1%
Lakshadweep91.8%93.9%
Kerala93.3%93.5%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

By sex (2011)
CommunityMaleFemale
Muslim74.8%62.1%
Other70.9%49.1%
Hindu81.7%64.4%
Sikh80.0%70.3%
Buddhist88.3%74.1%
Christian87.7%81.5%
Jain96.8%92.9%
All communities80.9%64.7%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2011)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim76.6%63.1%
Other79.7%57.8%
Hindu85.3%68.2%
Sikh86.5%70.9%
Buddhist87.3%76.7%
Christian92.9%78.7%
Jain96.5%88.6%
All communities84.2%67.8%

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: Census 2011 · C-series · Census 2001 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: · ·

What a household spends on one school student in an academic year: course fees, textbooks and stationery, uniform, transport and other items. Private coaching is counted separately and left out of this figure. For every INR 100 a Hindu household spends on a student's schooling, a Muslim household spends about INR 71. The reason is not that more Muslim children sit in free government schools: both communities use them at almost the same rate (55.4% and 56.5% of students). Muslim families spend less on fees, books and transport in whichever type of school their children attend.

INR 9,249per school student a year, excl. coaching(2025)
vs all communities
-INR 3,367
lower · INR 12,616
vs Hindu
-INR 3,692
lower · INR 12,941
Bottom line

In 2025 a Muslim household spent about INR 9,249 a year on one school child's fees, books, uniform and transport, against INR 12,941 in a Hindu household and INR 12,616 nationally. Both communities lean on free government schools at similar rates, so the shortfall of more than a quarter reflects what families can afford to add on top, not a different choice of school.

How to read the chart

The chart compares yearly per-student school spending across communities for 2017 and 2025; this is money spent, not an outcome, so neither higher nor lower is automatically good. Private coaching is excluded. The Urban vs rural tab shows the gap is widest in towns, where better-off families spend the most.

Why it matters

What a family can put behind each child, the books, a uniform, transport and the occasional extra, shapes how well that child does in the same classroom. Persistent under-spending is one of the quiet ways an income gap turns into an education gap.

Status

Contextgap widening

Muslim INR 9,249 vs Hindu INR 12,941 in 2025, INR 3,692 lower. The gap has held as spending rose across the board, so Muslim families are adding less per child even as every community spends more.

About this measurement

Definition. What a household spends on one school student in an academic year: course fees, textbooks and stationery, uniform, transport and other items. Private coaching is counted separately and left out of this figure. Muslim and Hindu families use free government schools at almost the same rate, so the gap is not about school choice: Muslim households spend less on fees, books and transport in whichever type of school their children attend.

Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of two NSS education rounds: the 75th (Sch 25.2, July 2017 - June 2018, 1.14 lakh households, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes) and the Comprehensive Modular Survey: Education (CMS:E, NSS 80th round, April - June 2025, 52,085 households, via the NADA CSV distribution). Average expenditure per student currently enrolled at school levels (pre-primary to higher secondary, incl. diploma/certificate up to higher-secondary equivalent) during the current academic year, excluding private coaching in both rounds (the CMS:E published headline construct; the 75th collects coaching as a separate item, so the build drops it for comparability). The 2017-18 estimator reproduces all 27 published anchor cells of NSS Report 585 Statements 19 and 21 within 0.01%; the 2025 estimator reproduces all seven published Report 595 per-student cells within 0.01%.

Neither publication breaks expenditure down by religion. A Muslim school student's year cost INR 9,249 against the all-India INR 12,616 in 2025 (Hindu INR 12,941), down as a share from 2017-18 (INR 5,532 against 7,041 all-India, Hindu 7,050): the Muslim household spends about 72% of what the Hindu household spends per student, where it was 78%. Unlike hospital costs, school choice is not the driver: 55.4% of Muslim students attend government schools against 56.5% of Hindu students (2025), so the gap comes from how much families spend in whichever school they use (fees, books, transport), not from heavier use of free government schools.

The trend line renders dashed: Report 595's own comparability section lists concept revisions vs the 75th round (school-only coverage, anganwadi counted as pre-primary, age universe 3+, itemised coaching), so the step between rounds is indicative. Values are nominal rupees of each round. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, not religions, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates.

Where this data comes from. CMS:E 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Download CSV: school-edu-spend.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2025)
CommunityUrbanRural
MuslimINR 13,987INR 6,812
HinduINR 25,588INR 8,329
ChristianINR 23,086INR 10,004
SikhINR 29,565INR 22,289
All communitiesINR 23,470INR 8,382

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: CMS:E 2025 (NSO unit-level data) · NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

Of every 100 young people in the college-going age band (18 to 23), how many are attending higher education, a graduate or postgraduate course. Measured from a household survey, so every community is counted the same way.

14.5%of 18-23-year-olds(2017)

higher is better

vs all communities
-8.3pp
behind · 22.8%
vs Hindu
-9.7pp
behind · 24.2%
among communities
4th of 4
bottom tier
Bottom line

Just 14.5% of Muslims aged 18 to 23 were attending higher education in 2017, against 24.2% of Hindus and 22.8% nationally: the lowest rate of any major community. Fewer than 15 in every 100 college-age Muslims are in a degree course, so the school-level literacy gap widens into a much larger gap at the top of the system.

How to read the chart

The chart sets the Muslim higher-education attendance rate beside Hindus, the all-India average and other communities for 2017, the one year a household survey measured it the same way for everyone; taller is better. This is a single snapshot, not a trend, so there is no line over time. The By sex tab splits the rate into Muslim men and women.

Why it matters

Higher education is the gateway to secure, salaried and professional work. A community that sends a far smaller share of its young people to college stays concentrated in informal, low-paid jobs, and the disadvantage compounds across generations.

Status

Behind

Muslim 14.5% vs Hindu 24.2% in 2017, 9.7pp behind. This is the widest community gap on the dashboard at the top of the education ladder, and it follows directly from the weaker school completion that comes before it.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Poverty · Higher education costs money and forgoes a wage, so poorer Muslim households pull young people into work before college ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • The school pipeline · With the highest school dropout of any large community, far fewer Muslims reach Class 12 in the first place, the gate to any degree ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • First-generation barrier · With few graduate parents, Muslim students navigate admissions, entrance exams and scholarships without family experience to draw on ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Not madrasas · The common claim that Muslims choose religious schooling over college is not the cause: Sachar found only about 4% of Muslim children attend a madrasa ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Uneven delivery · Scholarships and reservations exist on paper but reach Muslim students unevenly ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.

Key levers

  • Fix the pipeline first · The largest gains come earlier, by keeping Muslim students in school through to Class 12 ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Deliver scholarships reliably · The Post-Matric and Merit-cum-Means schemes exist; the Post-Sachar priority is consistent delivery, not new schemes ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.
  • Reach girls · The female shortfall is widest at this level, so women's access moves the rate the most.
  • Back minority colleges · Protect and strengthen Article 30 minority higher-education institutions through the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Of every 100 young people in the college-going age band (18 to 23), how many are attending higher education: a graduate or postgraduate degree course (after Class 12). Measured from a household survey that asks each family directly, so Muslims, Hindus and the all-India average are counted the same way.

Methodology. NSS Gross Attendance Ratio for "post higher secondary": persons currently attending graduate or postgraduate study (any age; NSS "level of current enrolment" codes 15 and 16) over the population aged 18-23, x100, from NSS 75th round Schedule 25.2 (Household Social Consumption: Education, July 2017-June 2018) unit-level data. Code 14 (diploma/certificate at graduation level) is excluded; including it overshoots the published cells by ~6%, and codes 15+16 reproduce all nine NSS Report 585 Statement 8 cells (rural/urban/all x male/female/person) to within 0.05pp. The statement does not split by religion, so the religion split is that validated pipeline applied to the religion-of-head variable.

This REPLACES the former AISHE administrative GER, which tagged only ~7% of all enrolment to a religion and so undercounted every community (its grouped "Other Minority Community" read ~13%, impossible for the highly-educated Christian/Sikh/Jain communities it pools) and published no Hindu figure. On the household-survey basis Muslims attend at 14.5%, Hindus 24.2%, all-India 22.8% (matching the published figure exactly): Muslims are at about 60% of the Hindu rate, the lowest of the major communities, with Muslim women (12.1%) below Muslim men (16.8%). Single validated round, so a snapshot: PLFS publishes no attendance ratio and runs ~8pp high for the same year, and the 71st (2014) education round is Nesstar-locked.

Where this data comes from. NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Download CSV: ger-higher-ed.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

By sex (2017)
CommunityMaleFemale
Muslim16.8%12.1%
Hindu26.1%22.0%
Sikh21.6%27.7%
Christian24.6%32.1%
All communities24.7%20.7%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: NSS 75th 25.2 Education (2017-18). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views:

Of people aged 15 and older, what share is in the workforce, either working or actively looking for work. The series now reaches back two decades: participation fell economy-wide from 2004 to 2017 and recovered after, with the Muslim rate trailing throughout.

55.0%working or seeking work, age 15+(2023)

higher is better

vs all communities
-5.1pp
behind · 60.1%
vs Hindu
-5.9pp
behind · 60.9%
among communities
4th of 4
bottom tier
Bottom line

About 55% of Muslims aged 15 and over were working or looking for work in 2023, against 61% of Hindus, but the whole of that gap is among women. Muslim men take part at slightly higher rates than Hindu men; Muslim women, at 30%, sit far below Hindu women at 43%, and that single gap pulls the community total down.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the share of adults in the labour force across two decades, from the older Employment surveys to the newer PLFS; the dashed break at 2017 marks the change of survey, so do not read the step there as a real fall. The By sex tab is the one to open here: it shows the gap is almost entirely about women. Working vs looking separates the employed from those still searching, and Urban vs rural splits the rate by place.

Why it matters

How many adults work or seek work sets the ceiling on a community's income. A large pool of working-age people outside the labour force, most of them women, means fewer earners in each household and less to go around.

Status

Behindgap narrowing

Muslim 55.0% vs Hindu 60.9% in 2023, 5.9pp behind. The headline gap has narrowed over twenty years, but largely because participation drifted down for everyone; the low rate among Muslim women is the part that has barely moved.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Women's participation · The gap is almost entirely a female one: Muslim women join the workforce at very low rates, for reasons that mix social norms, safety, childcare and a shortage of suitable local work ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Self-employment · Muslim men cluster in self-employment and family enterprise rather than wage work, which the surveys count but which offers thinner, less secure earnings ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Education · Lower schooling keeps many out of the formal jobs that draw people into the labour force in the first place ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.

Key levers

  • Enable women's work · Safe transport, childcare and nearby job creation do the most to lift the rate, since the female shortfall is where the gap lives.
  • Skilling · Vocational training through schemes like PM VIKAS and PMKVY widens the path into wage work.
  • Credit for enterprise · Affordable credit strengthens the self-employment many Muslim households already depend on.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Of everyone aged 15 and older, the share either working or actively looking for work.

Methodology. The 2023-24 point is PLFS 2023-24 Table 48 (pages 396-400), total residence, person-level; reference period Jul 2023 - Jun 2024 (year=2023 in the canonical row is the start of this period). The 2017-18 to 2022-23 points are computed from each PLFS round's unit-level microdata, pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: the report PDFs publish the 15+ religion split only for their own year, but the microdata carries household religion in every round. The computation reproduces each round's published all-India LFPR to 0.1 points and the 2023-24 religion table within 0.2, so the published point extends the same series.

The 2004/2009/2011 points reach back through the three quinquennial NSS Employment & Unemployment Survey rounds (61st/66th/68th), computed the same way from their unit data and reproducing the published by-religion statements of NSS Reports 568/552 cell-for-cell; the EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable, so the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Two decades tell one story: participation fell economy-wide between 2004-05 and 2017-18 (Muslim 15+ LFPR 55.1% to 45.0%, all-India 63.7% to 49.8%) and recovered after, but the Muslim rate has trailed the all-India rate by 5-9 points in every round since 2004. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider: indicative, no sub-state estimates).

The "Working vs looking" tab sets this rate against the worker population ratio (share actually working, wpr-15plus.csv) from the same source; the gap between them is unemployment.

Where this data comes from. PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: lfpr-15plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Working vs looking for work (2023)

The labour force is everyone working or looking for work, so the two bars sit almost on top of each other. The gap between them is unemployment: just 1.8 points for Muslims, and small for every community. Muslims rank last on participation not because they cannot find work, but because fewer enter the labour force at all, above all Muslim women (the By sex tab).

CommunityIn labour forceWorking
Muslim55.0%53.2%
Christian62.8%59.9%
Hindu60.9%59.1%
Sikh56.1%52.8%
All communities60.1%58.2%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Values come from lfpr-15plus.csv (in labour force) and wpr-15plus.csv (working); every row records its own source and method.

By sex (2023)
CommunityMaleFemale
Muslim80.6%30.2%
Sikh79.2%33.0%
Hindu78.6%43.3%
Christian76.3%50.4%
All communities78.8%41.7%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2023)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim49.4%58.2%
Sikh48.8%58.6%
Hindu52.5%64.4%
Christian52.9%68.6%
All communities52.0%63.7%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: · ·

Of people in the labour force (working or looking for work), what share cannot find work. A low rate is not automatically good news: people who cannot afford to stay unemployed take any informal work, so read it beside the salaried-jobs card.

3.2%of the labour force, age 15+(2023)

lower is better

vs all communities
+0.0pp
even · 3.2%
vs Hindu
+0.1pp
behind · 3.1%
among communities
2nd of 4
middle tier
Bottom line

At 3.2%, measured Muslim unemployment in 2023 was barely above the Hindu rate of 3.1%, and well below its late-2010s peak. But a low unemployment rate is not the good news it looks like: people who cannot afford to sit idle take whatever informal work they can find, so distress, not comfort, often keeps the number down.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the share of the labour force that is unemployed; the 2017 dashed break marks the switch to the PLFS survey. Read it alongside the salaried-jobs and consumption cards, because a low rate here sits next to low-paid, insecure work. The By sex and Urban vs rural tabs show where joblessness concentrates: among the educated, the urban and the young.

Why it matters

Open unemployment counts only those who can hold out for a job. For a poorer community it understates the real problem, which is not idleness but the scarcity of secure, decently paid work.

Status

At paritygap narrowing

Muslim 3.2% vs Hindu 3.1% in 2023, about level. Muslim unemployment ran clearly above the Hindu rate from 2017 to 2019 and has since converged; the gap that matters now is in the quality of work, not the headline rate.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Educated joblessness · As in every community, unemployment is highest among the better-educated young, who can wait for a suitable job; for Muslims this overlaps with the urban salaried gap ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • No cushion · Poorer households cannot afford open unemployment, so members take informal, casual work, which holds the measured rate down ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Discrimination · Audit studies that sent matched job applications found CVs with Muslim names called back less often, one barrier to the formal jobs people queue for ↗ Thorat and Attewell, 2007.

Key levers

  • Better jobs, not just any jobs · The goal is secure, formal employment, not a lower headline rate.
  • Skilling and placement · Training paired with active placement links job-seekers to formal work.
  • Fair hiring · Anonymised or audited recruitment counters the name-based bias the studies record ↗ Thorat and Attewell, 2007.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Of the labour force aged 15 and older (everyone working or looking for work), the share that cannot find work. A low rate is not automatically good news here: people who cannot afford to be unemployed take any informal work, so read this beside the salaried-jobs card.

Methodology. The 2017-18 to 2023-24 points are computed from each round's PLFS unit-level microdata, pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: the published PLFS annual reports never break the unemployment rate down by religion, so the microdata is the only source for that stretch. The 2004/2009/2011 points come from the three quinquennial EUS rounds (NSS 61st/66th/68th) the same way, and there the gate is direct: the computation reproduces the published by-religion unemployment rates of NSS Reports 568/552. The EUS era shows the same pattern in miniature: Muslim unemployment (2.3-3.0%) sat above the all-India rate (2.0-2.3%) in all three rounds, before both spiked in 2017-18.

EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable; the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Unemployed = usual principal status 81 (seeking/available for work); labour force = workers (ps+ss) plus unemployed; weights per the official estimation rule. The computation reproduces each round's published all-India unemployment rate to 0.1 points.

Muslim unemployment fell from 7.2% (2017-18, a point above the national 6.0%) to 3.2% (2023-24, at par with the national average), but over the same rounds the salaried share of Muslim workers also fell, so part of the convergence is absorption into self-employment and casual work rather than formal hiring. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider: indicative, no sub-state estimates). Year=Y is the start of the Jul-Y to Jun-(Y+1) reference period.

Where this data comes from. PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: unemployment-rate-15plus.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

By sex (2023)
CommunityMaleFemale
Muslim3.1%3.6%
Hindu3.1%2.9%
Christian4.3%5.5%
Sikh5.0%7.9%
All communities3.2%3.2%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2023)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim4.5%2.6%
Hindu5.1%2.4%
Christian6.6%3.9%
Sikh6.2%5.7%
All communities5.1%2.5%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: ·

Of all workers, what share has regular salaried jobs (as opposed to self-employment or casual labour). The Muslim share has trailed the all-India share in every survey round for two decades, and the gap is wider today than in 2004.

18.0%of all workers(2023)

higher is better

vs all communities
-3.7pp
behind · 21.7%
vs Hindu
-3.9pp
behind · 21.9%
among communities
4th of 4
bottom tier
Bottom line

Just 18% of Muslim workers hold a regular salaried job, against 22% of Hindus; most Muslims work for themselves or as casual labour. The gap is starkest in cities, where salaried work is common: there, about a third of Muslim workers are salaried, against half of Hindus.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the share of workers in regular salaried jobs over two decades, with the 2017 dashed break marking the move to the PLFS survey. The Urban vs rural tab carries the real story: the salaried gap is small in villages but very wide in towns. What it pays compares earnings inside those salaried jobs, and By sex splits the rate by gender.

Why it matters

A regular salaried job means a predictable wage, and often paid leave, provident fund and some security. The shortage of such jobs is the core of the Muslim economic disadvantage: not that Muslims do not work, but that their work is more often informal, self-run and insecure.

Status

Behindgap widening

Muslim 18.0% vs Hindu 21.9% in 2023, 3.9pp behind. The salaried share has risen for Muslims over twenty years, but the gap with Hindus has held, and it stays widest exactly where formal jobs are most available, in the cities.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Education · Regular salaried jobs increasingly need credentials that fewer Muslims hold, the labour-market end of the schooling gap ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Hiring discrimination · Resume-audit studies found applicants with Muslim names called back significantly less often than identical Hindu applicants ↗ Thorat and Attewell, 2007.
  • Self-employment · A long tilt toward family enterprise and trade, partly a response to closed doors, keeps many Muslims out of the wage sector ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Little public-sector work · Muslims are sharply under-represented in government jobs, which make up a large share of all salaried work ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.

Key levers

Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Of all workers, the share in regular salaried jobs rather than self-employment or casual labour.

Methodology. The 2023-24 point is PLFS 2023-24 Table 49 (pages 401-402), rural+urban person-level. Muslims are disproportionately self-employed (62.2% vs Hindu 58.3%) and under-represented in formal salaried work, the classic Sachar-era finding on labour-market segregation. The 2017-18 to 2022-23 points are computed from each PLFS round's unit-level microdata via the MoSPI NADA API (the PDFs publish this religion split only for their own year; the computation reproduces the 2023-24 published table within 0.2 points); the 2004/2009/2011 points come from the three quinquennial EUS rounds (NSS 61st/66th/68th), reproducing the published status-of-employment statements of NSS Reports 568/552.

The long view sharpens the finding: the Muslim salaried share has trailed the all-India share in every round for two decades (12.8% vs 14.4% in 2004-05, 16.2% vs 17.9% in 2011-12, 18.0% vs 21.7% in 2023-24), and within the PLFS years it FELL from its 2018-19 peak (22.2%) while participation rose, so the participation gains came in self-employment and casual work, not regular salaried jobs. EUS and PLFS designs are not strictly comparable; the line is dashed at the 2017 break. Religion is self-reported (NSO unit-data rider).

The "What it pays" tab folds in the pay counterpart computed from the same microdata rounds (the decarded salaried-earnings metric, anchored to the published all-ages earnings tables of the 2021-22 to 2023-24 reports across all 27 residence-by-sex cells within 0.03%): Muslim salaried workers earn 16-23% below the all-India average in every round (2023-24: INR 17,747 vs INR 21,067), so Muslims are both less likely to hold a regular salaried job and paid less when they do. Earnings rupees are nominal, so the comparable story is the gap, not the level.

Where this data comes from. PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Download CSV: salaried-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Public vs private (2023)

Of all workers, the share holding a regular GOVERNMENT salaried job (government, local bodies and public-sector undertakings), computed from PLFS 2023-24 microdata. About 2.8% of Muslim workers hold a public-sector job, against 5.0% of Hindus and 4.9% nationally, the lowest of any major community. Set against the host card: of the 18% of Muslim workers who are salaried, only about a sixth are in the secure public sector, so most of the Muslim salaried shortfall sits in government jobs, a long-standing Sachar Committee finding. Private salaried work is the rest.

CommunityIn govt jobs
Muslim2.8%
Buddhist11.6%
Christian9.0%
Other6.4%
Sikh5.6%
Jain5.2%
Hindu5.0%
All communities4.9%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Monthly pay in salaried jobs (2017-2023)

Average monthly pay in regular salaried jobs (gross, preceding month, age 15+). Muslim salaried workers earned INR 17,747 a month in 2023 against the all-India INR 21,067, about 16% less, and the gap has stayed at 16-23% in every round since 2017-18. Rupees are nominal, so the rising lines mostly track inflation; the gap between the lines is the comparable story.

CommunityOverallUrbanRural
MuslimINR 17,747INR 18,396INR 16,811
ChristianINR 25,093INR 28,010INR 21,176
HinduINR 21,344INR 25,032INR 16,528
SikhINR 17,055INR 22,349INR 13,783
All communitiesINR 21,067INR 24,440INR 16,658

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

By sex (2023)
CommunityMaleFemale
Muslim20.8%10.9%
Hindu25.3%15.8%
Christian28.4%26.3%
Sikh26.7%26.9%
All communities24.9%15.9%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2023)
CommunityUrbanRural
Muslim32.7%11.0%
Hindu50.0%12.7%
Christian52.4%16.8%
Sikh45.7%21.4%
All communities47.5%12.7%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: PLFS 2023-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · PLFS microdata 2017-24 · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th) · EUS microdata 2004-12 (NSS 61st/66th/68th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: · · ·

How much a typical person in a community spends in a month, on food, rent, fuel, clothes and everything else. In India this is the usual way to measure how well-off people are, because reliable income data does not exist.

INR 4,455(2023)

higher is better

vs all communities
-INR 503
behind · INR 4,958
vs Hindu
-INR 519
behind · INR 4,974
Bottom line

An average Muslim spent INR 4,455 a month in 2023, about a tenth less than the INR 4,974 a Hindu spent and below the national INR 4,958. Spending is the standard yardstick of living standards in India, used because no reliable income figure by religion exists, and on it Muslims sit at the lower end.

How to read the chart

The chart compares average monthly spending per person across communities; higher means a higher material standard of living. The By state tab shows how far this swings across India, Top spending fifth looks at the better-off slice of each community, and Urban vs rural splits town from village. Spending gaps are narrower than wealth gaps, because even poorer households must spend to live.

Why it matters

Monthly spending is the closest thing to a living-standards thermometer India has by religion. It rolls food, rent, fuel, schooling and health into one figure, and a persistent gap means a persistently lower standard of everyday life.

Status

Behind

Muslim INR 4,455 vs Hindu INR 4,974 in 2023, INR 519 behind. The Muslim shortfall in spending, around a tenth, is smaller than the gap in wealth, the deeper divide; consumption gaps compress because everyone must eat and pay rent.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Lower earnings · The consumption gap flows from the jobs gap: more informal, self-run and casual work means lower and less certain household income ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • More mouths · A larger average household spreads the same earnings across more people, lowering spending per head ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Urban poverty · Muslims are concentrated in towns, but in their poorer, informal-economy parts, where costs are high and wages low ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.

Key levers

  • Raise earnings · The durable lever is better, more formal work, the same fix as the jobs cards.
  • Targeted welfare · Food, fuel and cash support reach poorer Muslim households through universal rather than separate schemes ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.
  • Education · Schooling is the slow lever that lifts the next generation's earnings and spending.
Key stakeholders
  • National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation: A statutory corporation under the Ministry of Minority Affairs that provides concessional credit for self-employment and skills to the notified minority communities.
  • Ministry of Minority Affairs: The Union ministry for the welfare and economic development of India's notified minorities, running scholarship, skilling and livelihood schemes.
  • Sahulat Microfinance Society: A national NGO that promotes interest-free microfinance for marginalised communities through a network of member-owned credit cooperatives. Donate
  • SEWA Bharat GiveIndia vetted: A federation that builds financial independence for informal-sector women through credit cooperatives, banking access and financial literacy. Donate
  • Rang De: An RBI-regulated peer-to-peer social-investing platform that channels low-cost credit to low-income rural entrepreneurs, most of them women.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Average monthly spending per person (Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure, MPCE). In India this is the standard measure of economic well-being, used in place of income, for which no reliable figure by religion exists.

Methodology. The 2023-24 figure is computed from the unit-level microdata of HCES 2023-24 (NSO, 2.61 lakh households), pulled via the MoSPI NADA API: weighted monthly per capita consumption expenditure (food + consumables & services + durables, 365-day items annualised), cross-classified by the religion of the household head. The method reproduces the published national MPCE (rural INR 4,122 / urban INR 6,996) within about 2% before the religion split is taken. NSO's note for unit-level users cautions that religion is self-reported and unverified and that the survey is designed to estimate MPCE with the State/UT as the basic stratum, so the religion figures are best read as indicative, no sub-state estimates are made, and the survey's internal Muslim population share (13%) sits a little below the Census.

The earlier benchmark is the Sachar Committee (2006) from the NSS 61st round (2004-05): Muslims INR 635 vs the all-India INR 712, near SC/ST (INR 520) and far below upper-caste 'Hindu General' households (INR 1,023). The two rounds use different consumption methods (2004-05 URP vs 2023-24 MMRP) and rupees are nominal, so the level change over time is mostly inflation; the comparable story is the relative gap, which is stable at about 10% below the national average across the 20 years and is widest in towns (urban Muslims INR 5,467 vs urban Hindus INR 7,064). The By state tab shows the 2023-24 per-state Muslim MPCE computed from the same microdata, urban and rural separately (State/UT is the survey's basic stratum, so this is the finest permitted cut; cells with fewer than 30 sampled Muslim households are suppressed).

The Sachar 2004-05 state figures remain in the downloadable data file. The "Top spending fifth" tab folds in the distribution counterpart computed from the same microdata with the same validated MPCE machinery (the decarded top-quintile-share metric): person-weighted national MPCE quintile cuts (INR 2,903 / 3,677 / 4,632 / 6,302 per person per month), with every all-India quintile share equal to 20.0 by construction as the built-in validation. Muslims sit at par in the poorest fifth (20.5%) but only 13.7% reach the richest fifth (Hindu 20.2%, Christian 30.0%, Sikh 40.6%), and the squeeze is urban: 26.3% of urban Muslims reach the national top fifth against 45.3% of urban Hindus.

Where this data comes from. HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Download CSV: mpce.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Top spending fifth (2023)

Of each community's population, the share living in households in the top 20% of spending nationally. An even spread would put every community at 20.0%; only 13.7% of Muslims reach the top fifth, and the squeeze is urban: 26.3% of urban Muslims make the national top fifth against 45.3% of urban Hindus. Muslims sit at par in the poorest fifth, so the distribution is compressed below the top, not crowded at the bottom.

CommunityOverallUrbanRural
Muslim13.7%26.3%6.5%
Sikh40.6%58.5%34.4%
Christian30.0%57.4%17.9%
Hindu20.2%45.3%10.1%
All communities20.0%42.9%10.3%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Muslim by state, urban vs rural (24 states)
State / UTUrbanRural
Andaman & Nicobar IslandsINR 9,652INR 8,017
Tamil NaduINR 7,211INR 5,690
TelanganaINR 6,632INR 5,059
KeralaINR 6,621INR 5,422
TripuraINR 6,567INR 6,232
PunjabINR 6,461INR 5,144
HaryanaINR 6,243INR 5,659
MaharashtraINR 5,977INR 4,000
Andhra PradeshINR 5,975INR 5,124
LakshadweepINR 5,881INR 6,654
Jammu & KashmirINR 5,850INR 4,625
LadakhINR 5,742INR 4,186
KarnatakaINR 5,670INR 4,348
OdishaINR 5,589INR 3,951
GujaratINR 5,491INR 4,066
JharkhandINR 5,478INR 3,273
ManipurINR 5,410INR 4,924
UttarakhandINR 5,384INR 4,534
RajasthanINR 4,955INR 4,488
AssamINR 4,855INR 3,439
BiharINR 4,715INR 3,669
Madhya PradeshINR 4,643INR 3,592
West BengalINR 4,463INR 3,538
Uttar PradeshINR 4,417INR 3,526

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2023)
CommunityUrbanRural
MuslimINR 5,467INR 3,874
HinduINR 7,064INR 4,135
All communitiesINR 6,863INR 4,149

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: HCES 2023-24 (NSO unit-level data) · Sachar Committee (NSS 2004-05). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

More views: · ·

What an average household owns (land, buildings, livestock, vehicles, financial assets) minus what it owes. Accumulated wealth runs a far wider gap than monthly spending, though the gap narrowed between 2012 and 2018: urban Muslim households went from holding about half the net worth of urban Hindu households to about two-thirds.

INR 15.0 lakhowned minus owed(2018)

higher is better

vs all communities
-INR 3.9 lakh
behind · INR 18.9 lakh
vs Hindu
-INR 3.8 lakh
behind · INR 18.8 lakh
among communities
4th of 4
bottom tier
Bottom line

The average Muslim household was worth about INR 15.0 lakh in 2018, what it owns minus what it owes, against INR 18.8 lakh for a Hindu household. The wealth gap, about a fifth, runs deeper than the gap in monthly spending, because wealth is the slow build-up of land, property and savings that disadvantage compounds over generations.

How to read the chart

The chart compares average household net worth, assets minus debts, for 2012 and 2018. Wealth is a stock, not a flow, so it moves slowly and gaps are wide. The Borrowing sources tab shows where each community turns for credit, banks or moneylenders, and Urban vs rural splits the two.

Why it matters

Wealth is the cushion that income is not: it pays for a medical emergency, a business or a child's education without borrowing at ruinous rates. A thinner cushion leaves a household one shock away from crisis, with less to pass on.

Status

Behindgap narrowing

Muslim INR 15.0 lakh vs Hindu INR 18.8 lakh in 2018, INR 3.8 lakh behind. Muslim household wealth grew faster than Hindu wealth between 2012 and 2018, closing the ratio a little, but the absolute gap remains around a fifth.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Lower income · Less is earned, so less can be saved or invested; the wealth gap starts as the income gap ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Less land and property · Muslims own less agricultural land and are more often urban tenants than home-owners, the assets that make up most Indian wealth ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Credit exclusion · Lower access to bank credit, including the documented marking of Muslim-concentrated areas as negative for lending, pushes households to costlier informal borrowing that erodes wealth ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.

Key levers

  • Formal credit · Bringing Muslim-concentrated areas fully into priority-sector bank lending lowers the cost of building assets ↗ Post-Sachar Evaluation Committee, 2014.
  • Interest-free and micro-finance · Cooperative and interest-free finance reaches households the banks miss.
  • Asset programmes · Housing and enterprise schemes that build durable assets close the stock gap faster than income alone.
Key stakeholders
  • National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation: A statutory corporation under the Ministry of Minority Affairs that provides concessional credit for self-employment and skills to the notified minority communities.
  • Ministry of Minority Affairs: The Union ministry for the welfare and economic development of India's notified minorities, running scholarship, skilling and livelihood schemes.
  • Sahulat Microfinance Society: A national NGO that promotes interest-free microfinance for marginalised communities through a network of member-owned credit cooperatives. Donate
  • SEWA Bharat GiveIndia vetted: A federation that builds financial independence for informal-sector women through credit cooperatives, banking access and financial literacy. Donate
  • Rang De: An RBI-regulated peer-to-peer social-investing platform that channels low-cost credit to low-income rural entrepreneurs, most of them women.

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. What an average household owns (land, buildings, livestock, machinery, vehicles, financial assets) minus what it owes, measured by the national debt and investment survey as on mid-2012 and mid-2018. Wealth is the stock that spending cannot show, and wealth gaps compound across generations, so they run far wider than spending gaps.

Methodology. Computed from the unit-level microdata of AIDIS (All-India Debt & Investment Survey) Visit 1, two rounds: NSS 70th (1.11 lakh households, assets and debt as on 30.06.2012, via the MoSPI NADA API) and NSS 77th (1.16 lakh households, as on 30.06.2018, via MoSPI's original fixed-width TXT distribution; the NADA copy of that round is a proprietary binary, so the build reads the surviving mirror recorded in the repo's provenance notes). The published reports break wealth down by social group but never by religion. The 2018 estimator reproduces the published all-India average assets and average debt EXACTLY to the rupee; 2012 reproduces debt and indebtedness exactly and assets within 0.75% (a documented empty-column defect in MoSPI's own CSV conversion of the non-farm-equipment block).

Muslim households held INR 15.0 lakh in 2018 against the all-India INR 18.9 lakh (79%) and Hindu INR 18.8 lakh (80%), up from 66% and 67% in 2012; the urban gap narrowed most, with urban Muslim households moving from 51% to 67% of urban Hindu net worth (INR 18.0 vs 26.7 lakh in 2018) while rural moved from 83% to 87%. Values are nominal rupees of each round's reference date. Gold and ornaments sit outside the published asset concept (roughly 3-4% on top); land is valued at guideline rather than market rates.

Values rounded to the nearest INR 1,000. NSO unit-data rider: religion is self-reported and the survey is stratified for states, so the split is indicative with no sub-state estimates. The "Borrowing sources" tab folds in the companion measure from the same microdata (the decarded institutional-credit-share metric): the institutional share of outstanding cash debt among indebted households, reproducing the published all-India shares in both rounds (2012 rural 56.0 / urban 84.5 exactly; 2018 rural 66 / urban 87).

There the trend cuts the other way: the Muslim share stood still (68.3% to 68.7%) while the Hindu share rose (72.4% to 77.1%), widening the urban gap to 17 points (71.3 vs 88.4). Muslims also borrow the least overall (26.8% of households indebted vs Hindu 31.4% in 2018). Credit-agency code 09 "others" is non-institutional despite its position in the code list in both rounds (the layout trap is documented in the repo).

Where this data comes from. AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Download CSV: household-net-worth.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

From microdata Reproduce this. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Borrowing sources (2018)

Of the money indebted households owe, the share borrowed from institutional lenders (banks, co-operatives, government and related agencies) rather than moneylenders, shopkeepers or relatives. Informal credit is costlier and unprotected. As Indian borrowing formalised between 2012 and 2018 the Muslim share stood still (68.3% to 68.7%) while the Hindu share rose (72.4% to 77.1%), and the urban gap widened: 71.3% of urban Muslim debt is institutional against 88.4% for urban Hindus. Muslims also borrow the least overall: 26.8% of Muslim households were indebted against 31.4% of Hindu households in 2018.

CommunityOverallUrbanRural
Muslim68.7%71.3%66.1%
Sikh82.7%92.9%76.0%
Hindu77.1%88.4%65.6%
Christian76.3%84.5%68.1%
All communities76.7%87.1%66.1%

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Urban vs rural (2018)
CommunityUrbanRural
MuslimINR 18.0 lakhINR 13.0 lakh
HinduINR 26.7 lakhINR 15.0 lakh
ChristianINR 28.2 lakhINR 16.0 lakh
SikhINR 50.1 lakhINR 45.0 lakh
All communitiesINR 26.0 lakhINR 15.3 lakh

From microdata Reproduce this view. This figure is recomputed from the unit-level survey microdata, the raw NSS or PLFS records behind the linked source. Source: AIDIS 2019 (NSS 77th) · AIDIS 2013 (NSS 70th). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

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Representation

Far fewer elected seats than their share of the population, both in the Lok Sabha and across the state assemblies.

How many of the 543 seats in India's national parliament (Lok Sabha) are held by Muslim MPs, counted at every general election since 1952. At the community's 14.2% population share, parity would be 77 seats; the count peaked at 49 in 1980 and stands at 24 today.

24of 543 seats(2024)
vs population
-53 seats
parity at 14.2% would be 77
trend
1952-2024
21 → 24 MPs
Bottom line

Muslims hold 24 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha elected in 2024, about 4.4%, against a 14.2% share of the population. If seats matched population there would be roughly 77 Muslim MPs. Representation in Parliament peaked in the 1980s and has drifted down since, even as the population share rose.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the number, and share, of Muslim members of the Lok Sabha at each general election since 1952, against the population-parity mark of 77 seats. This card counts seats won, not votes cast or candidates fielded, so it measures outcomes, not effort.

Why it matters

Who sits in the legislature shapes which concerns reach the floor, which laws pass and how budgets are shared. Persistent under-representation of a seventh of the country means a large community's voice is thinner in the rooms where decisions are made.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Dispersed population · Muslims are a minority almost everywhere and a majority in very few constituencies, so a first-past-the-post system rarely returns a Muslim member ↗ Ranganath Misra Commission, 2007.
  • Fewer candidates · Parties have fielded steadily fewer Muslim candidates over recent decades, narrowing the pool that can win ↗ Beg, The India Forum.
  • Polarisation · Where elections turn on community lines, Muslim candidates draw fewer cross-community votes, lowering their odds in mixed seats ↗ Beg, The India Forum.

Key levers

  • Candidate selection · The most direct lever sits with the parties, in how many Muslim candidates they field in winnable seats.
  • Voter participation · Complete electoral rolls and turnout efforts, the Election Commission's remit, ensure the community's votes are fully counted.
  • Local office · Representation in panchayats and municipalities builds the pipeline of candidates for higher office.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. How many of the 543 seats in India's national parliament (Lok Sabha) are held by Muslim MPs, counted at every general election since 1952. At the community's 14.2% population share, parity would be 77 seats; the count peaked at 49 in 1980 and stands at 24 today.

Methodology. Religion is not tabulated by either ECI or PRS Legislative Research in their official candidate-profile publications. Underlying data is ECI candidate affidavits classified post-election by journalists and researchers. Figures cross-verified across multiple sources: Maktoob Media, FACTLY, The India Forum, Statista.

Documented as "manual entry" canonical with citations in each row's methodology note. The series covers all 18 general elections, 1952-2024: the 1952-2004 figures are from historical compilations (The India Forum, Statista), 2009 onward cross-verified across the sources above. The card displays the absolute number of Muslim MPs per house (user call, Commit FW: counts read more directly than shares); the percentage rides in the canonical data, where the denominator record carries each house's N-of-M seat count, and house sizes ranged from 489 (1952) to 543 (since 1996).

Representation peaked at 49 MPs (9%) in 1980 and has sat between 22 and 27 since 2014: 2009=28/543, 2014=22/543, 2019=27/543, 2024=24/543. At the Muslim population share of ~14.2%, parity in the current house would be 77 seats, a chronic shortfall of about 50 seats. The state-assembly layer of the same affidavit-classified sourcing is the separate "Muslim share of state assemblies" card (about 6% of seats across the 31 covered assemblies).

Where this data comes from. PRS / ECI affidavits. Download CSV: ls-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Hand-compiled Reproduce this. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Across all 31 state and UT legislative assemblies that hold elections, what share of MLA seats is held by Muslims. Each state pairs two bars: the maroon share of assembly seats against the grey share of population (Census 2011), so each state's seats can be compared at a glance with its share of the population.

6.0%of state-assembly seats (agg.)(2024)
vs population
-8.2pp
vs 14.2% pop share
all states
6.0%
aggregate across assemblies
Bottom line

Muslims hold about 6% of seats across India's state legislative assemblies, against a 14.2% population share. The shortfall is narrower than in the Lok Sabha but still wide, and it varies sharply from state to state, which the By assembly tab lays out.

How to read the chart

The chart shows the Muslim share of seats in each state and union-territory assembly at its most recent election, with a national aggregate of about 6%. The By assembly tab ranks the states and pairs each one's seat share against its Muslim population share, so you can see where representation tracks numbers and where it falls far short.

Why it matters

State assemblies decide on policing, land, health and schooling, the services that touch daily life most directly. Thin representation in them means fewer voices on exactly the local decisions that shape a community's living conditions.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Geography by state · Representation roughly tracks where Muslims are concentrated enough to swing a seat; states with a dispersed Muslim population elect almost none ↗ Ranganath Misra Commission, 2007.
  • Candidate selection · As in Parliament, party ticket decisions set the ceiling on how many Muslims can win an assembly seat ↗ Beg, The India Forum.
  • Reserved seats · Seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, which Muslims cannot contest as such, remove some constituencies from the open pool ↗ Ranganath Misra Commission, 2007.

Key levers

  • Party tickets · The direct lever is how many Muslim candidates parties field in winnable assembly seats.
  • Local pipeline · Strong representation in local bodies feeds candidates upward into assembly contests.
  • Inclusive rolls · Complete electoral rolls and turnout work ensure no eligible voter is left uncounted.
Key stakeholders

Badges link to an independent or registered credential where the organisation publishes one (Credibility Alliance, GiveIndia, 80G, FCRA). Many smaller NGOs do not take part in these registries, so a missing badge is not a mark against an organisation.

About this measurement

Definition. Percentage of state legislative assembly seats held by Muslim MLAs. National aggregate (~6%) plus per-assembly values for all 31 state + UT assemblies that hold elections (28 states + Delhi, Puducherry, J&K, most-recent election per assembly, spanning 2020-2026). Each state pairs two bars: the maroon share of assembly seats against the grey share of population (Census 2011), so each state's seats can be compared at a glance with its share of the population.

Methodology. Manual-entry metric, like ls-share: religion is not officially tabulated by ECI or PRS. Underlying data is candidate-affidavit religion classified post-election by journalists (Maktoob, Clarion, India Forum, The Wire, Deccan Herald, Outlook, Radiance Weekly, Free Press Journal, ummid.com, thenewzradar). National aggregate ~6% across the 31 covered assemblies.

Highest: J&K 60% (2024, first election since Article 370 reorg); Kerala 25%, Assam 24.6%. Lowest: HP / Goa / Mizoram / Nagaland / Sikkim / Arunachal / Chhattisgarh / Tripura / Meghalaya, all 0% (most have never elected a Muslim MLA in state history). Each row's methodology_note cites the source compilation(s) used.

The per-state population context (the grey bars and the By-assembly table's population column) is the Census 2011 Muslim share: the J&K figure includes pre-2019 Ladakh, and Telangana's figure (12.7%) is aggregated from the ten undivided-Andhra-Pradesh census districts that formed the state in 2014, Hyderabad included.

Where this data comes from. PRS / ECI affidavits. Download CSV: mla-share.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Hand-compiled Reproduce this. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Muslim share by assembly (31 assemblies)

Muslims hold about 6% of seats across the 31 state and UT assemblies covered, each at its most recent election, against a 14.2% share of the population. Jammu & Kashmir leads at 60.0%; 9 assemblies have no Muslim MLA at all. Each row pairs the maroon seat-share bar with a grey bar for the state's Muslim population share (Census 2011; the J&K figure includes pre-2019 Ladakh, and Telangana's aggregates the ten undivided-AP districts that formed the state in 2014).

AssemblyElectionMuslim MLAsSeat sharePopulation share
Jammu & Kashmir202454 of 9060.0%68.3%
Kerala202635 of 14025.0%26.6%
Assam202131 of 12624.6%34.2%
West Bengal202640 of 29313.7%27.0%
Uttar Pradesh202234 of 4038.4%19.3%
Bihar202019 of 2437.8%16.9%
Telangana20237 of 1195.9%12.7%
NCT of Delhi20254 of 705.7%12.9%
Haryana20245 of 905.6%7.0%
Uttarakhand20223 of 704.3%13.9%
Karnataka20239 of 2244.0%12.9%
Jharkhand20243 of 813.7%14.5%
Maharashtra202410 of 2883.5%11.5%
Puducherry20211 of 303.3%6.1%
Rajasthan20236 of 2003.0%9.1%
Tamil Nadu20215 of 2342.1%5.9%
Andhra Pradesh20243 of 1751.7%9.6%
Manipur20221 of 601.7%8.4%
Gujarat20223 of 1821.7%9.7%
Madhya Pradesh20232 of 2300.9%6.6%
Punjab20221 of 1170.9%1.9%
Odisha20241 of 1470.7%2.2%
Arunachal Pradesh20240 of 600.0%2.0%
Sikkim20240 of 320.0%1.6%
Chhattisgarh20230 of 900.0%2.0%
Tripura20230 of 600.0%8.6%
Meghalaya20230 of 600.0%4.4%
Nagaland20230 of 600.0%2.5%
Mizoram20230 of 400.0%1.4%
Himachal Pradesh20220 of 680.0%2.2%
Goa20220 of 400.0%8.3%

Hand-compiled Reproduce this view. These counts are hand-compiled from election-wise ECI candidate affidavits and cross-checked across multiple journalistic sources, since no single official source tabulates members by religion. Source: PRS / ECI affidavits. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

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Justice & Civic

Over-represented in the prison and undertrial populations per head of community, alongside police-recorded communal incidents.

For every 100,000 people of a religion, how many are in prison. Allows fair comparison across communities of different size.

63.3prisoners per 100k of community(2022)

lower is better

vs all communities
+18.7
behind · 44.6
vs Hindu
+23.5
behind · 39.8
among communities
3rd of 4
bottom tier
Bottom line

Muslims are imprisoned at about 63 per 100,000 of their population, against 40 for Hindus and 45 nationally, so a Muslim is around one and a half times as likely to be in jail as the average Indian. Most of this is not about conviction: a large majority of all prisoners are undertrials, awaiting trial rather than found guilty, and Muslims are over-represented among them.

How to read the chart

The chart compares the incarceration rate, prisoners per 100,000 of each community's own population, so it is not distorted by community size. The Undertrials tab is the one to read closely: it shows how much of the gap is people held awaiting trial, not convicts. By state shows how sharply this varies across India.

Why it matters

Who is in prison, and who waits there untried, is one of the clearest tests of equal justice. Over-incarceration, especially of the unconvicted, falls hardest on poor families who lose an earner and cannot afford bail or a lawyer.

Status

Behind

Muslim 63.3 vs Hindu 39.8 in 2022, 23.5 behind. The gap is driven less by convictions than by pre-trial detention: most Muslim prisoners are undertrials, where poverty, the cost of bail and slow courts weigh heaviest.

Deeper analysis

Potential drivers

  • Undertrials · Most prisoners of every community are undertrials, not convicts, and Muslims are over-represented among them, so the gap is largely about who is held before trial ↗ India Justice Report, 2025.
  • Poverty and bail · Those who cannot afford a bail bond or a lawyer stay inside; the community's higher poverty translates into longer pre-trial detention ↗ Sachar Committee Report, 2006.
  • Slow courts · Chronic case backlogs keep undertrials in jail for months or years, magnifying any disparity at the point of arrest ↗ India Justice Report, 2025.

Key levers

  • Bail reform · Easier, affordable bail and personal-bond release for the poor would cut undertrial numbers fastest ↗ India Justice Report, 2025.
  • Legal aid · Prompt, free legal representation, the National Legal Services Authority's mandate, shortens detention.
  • Undertrial review · Regular review committees and faster trials clear the backlog of people held without conviction ↗ India Justice Report, 2025.
Key stakeholders
  • National Legal Services Authority: The statutory authority that provides free legal aid to weaker sections and runs Undertrial Review Committees and Lok Adalats to reduce pending cases and unnecessary detention.
  • Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative: An independent, non-partisan human-rights NGO whose prison-reform work targets unnecessary pre-trial detention and legal aid for prisoners. Donate
  • Project 39A, National Law University Delhi: A university criminal-justice centre, named after Article 39A, working on legal aid, fair trial, sentencing and torture prevention.
  • India Justice Report: A periodic data initiative, produced by Tata Trusts with research partners, that ranks states on police, prisons, judiciary and legal aid, including undertrial and prison-demographic statistics.
About this measurement

Definition. Incarceration rate: prisoners of religion R per 100,000 of religion R's total population. More direct measure of disproportion than "share of prisoners", comparable across religions without needing to know population baselines.

Methodology. Cross-source: NCRB PSI 2022 total prisoner count (convicts + undertrials + detenues + other prisoners; STATES + UTs subtotals = ALL-INDIA by construction) divided by Census 2011 national religious population times 100,000. The 'denominator' column on each canonical row records the exact (count, population) pair used. Caveat: Maharashtra non-reporting of religion for ~33k undertrials/detenues, so the religion-reported numerator excludes those; full national population is the denominator.

The "Undertrials" tab folds in the sister metric (the decarded undertrial-rate-per-100k, NCRB PSI 2022 Table 2.11C over the same Census 2011 denominators): 48.8 Muslim undertrials per 100,000 against 29.3 Hindu and 33.2 all-India, a sharper over-representation than for prisoners overall, so the disproportion is largest before any conviction. Same Maharashtra caveat applies.

Where this data comes from. NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Download CSV: prison-rate-per-100k.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Computed Reproduce this. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Undertrials (2022)

Undertrial prisoners are in jail awaiting trial, not convicted of anything. For every 100,000 Muslims, 48.8 were undertrials in 2022, against 29.3 per 100,000 Hindus and 33.2 all-India. Relative to the all-India rate the Muslim over-representation is sharper among undertrials than among prisoners overall (1.5x vs 1.4x), so the disproportion is largest before any conviction. Same Maharashtra religion-reporting caveat as the incarceration chart.

CommunityPer 100,000
Muslim48.8
Sikh97.5
Christian39.1
Hindu29.3
All communities33.2

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

Full state data (33 states, 2022)
State / UTMuslimHindu
Punjab278.384.2
Mizoram262.933.2
NCT of Delhi238.390.9
Haryana182.891.3
Chandigarh174.9118.6
Chhattisgarh170.779.1
Odisha140.541.6
Uttarakhand132.152.4
Madhya Pradesh126.963.9
Nagaland126.652.6
Sikkim121.666.6
Goa115.243.2
Himachal Pradesh113.439.3
Uttar Pradesh83.853.9
Meghalaya83.651.7
Tripura82.027.9
Arunachal Pradesh77.725.9
Manipur76.326.5
Andaman & Nicobar Islands74.045.0
Rajasthan73.030.1
Jharkhand68.262.1
Tamil Nadu65.121.4
Gujarat59.324.3
Assam58.523.1
West Bengal50.324.9
Bihar48.465.3
Jammu & Kashmir44.535.5
Karnataka38.624.5
Kerala29.925.9
Puducherry18.527.0
Maharashtra17.95.1
Andhra Pradesh10.28.1
Lakshadweep9.6n/a

Computed Reproduce this view. This figure is computed from the linked published tables. Source: NCRB PSI (2018-2023) · Census 2011 · C-series. Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

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Number of communal or religious rioting incidents recorded in police records each year (NCRB).

272incidents(2023)

lower is better

trend
2015-2023
789 → 272
Bottom line

India's official tally of communal or religious rioting incidents was 272 in 2023, down from a recent peak of 869 in 2016, though the count swings sharply from year to year, it was 857 in 2020. Read this number with care: it captures only incidents the police formally recorded under one narrow crime-records category, it is widely regarded as an undercount, and it is not broken down by which community was affected.

How to read the chart

The chart tracks the National Crime Records Bureau's annual count of communal and religious rioting incidents from 2015 to 2023; lower is better, but the line is only as complete as official recording. This is one specific NCRB sub-category, so it misses incidents logged under other heads or never registered, and unlike the rest of this dashboard it is not split by religion. The By state tab shows where recorded incidents cluster.

Why it matters

Communal violence falls hardest on minorities, and the threat of it shapes where Muslims feel safe to live, work and worship. An honest, complete count would be one of the most important measures on this dashboard; the distance between what is recorded here and what communities actually experience is itself part of the story.

Key stakeholders
  • National Foundation for Communal Harmony: An autonomous body under the Home Ministry that promotes communal harmony and supports the rehabilitation and education of children orphaned in communal, caste or terrorist violence.
  • National Human Rights Commission: The statutory commission that inquires into human-rights violations, including in communal incidents, and recommends remedies and compensation.
  • National Commission for Minorities: A statutory body under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 that monitors the constitutional and legal safeguards of the notified minority communities.
About this measurement

Definition. Number of communal/religious rioting incidents recorded by NCRB under IPC Sec.147-151 (rioting), specifically the "Communal/Religious" sub-classification. National annual totals (2015-2023) plus state-level breakdown for 2022 and 2023.

Methodology. NCRB Crime in India, Table 1.2 row 23.1 'Communal/Religious' rioting. National series 2015-2023, compiled across multiple Crime in India volumes (CII 2017 through 2023, each carrying a multi-year national panel); state-level breakdown for 2022 and 2023. Incident counts only, with no religion of victim/perpetrator in the published table.

Caveat: several states stopped recording 'communal' as a separate crime category since ~2017, which deflates the national total over time. Civil-society compilations typically report higher counts.

Where this data comes from. NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023). Download CSV: communal-incidents-govt.csv. You can open any of these to check the numbers on this chart yourself.

Read Reproduce this. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Every figure on this card, in every tab, is computed from the data file above by an open script: transform code. Each data-file row also records its own source and method.

Full state data (35 states, 2023)
State / UTIncidents
Bihar107
Odisha44
Maharashtra27
Jharkhand19
Karnataka18
Madhya Pradesh18
Haryana11
NCT of Delhi7
Tamil Nadu6
Gujarat5
Chhattisgarh4
Telangana2
Assam1
Kerala1
Rajasthan1
West Bengal1
Andhra Pradesh0
Arunachal Pradesh0
Goa0
Himachal Pradesh0
Manipur0
Meghalaya0
Mizoram0
Nagaland0
Punjab0
Sikkim0
Tripura0
Uttar Pradesh0
Uttarakhand0
Andaman & Nicobar Islands0
Chandigarh0
Jammu & Kashmir0
Ladakh0
Lakshadweep0
Puducherry0

Read Reproduce this view. This figure is published directly in the linked source table. Source: NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023) · NCRB CII (2015-2023). Each value is computed from the data file · transform code; every row records its own source and method.

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All 23 indicators in one table sorted by gap size · click to expand
Metric Year Muslim Hindu All Gap vs reference
Muslims in the Lok Sabha202424 of 543 seatsn/an/a-53 seats vs 77-seat parity (14.2% pop)
Muslim incarceration rate202263.339.844.6+23.5
State MLA Muslim share20246.0%n/an/a-8.2pp vs 14.2% pop
Urban share201139.9%29.2%31.1%+10.7pp vs Hindu
Higher-education attendance rate201714.5%24.2%22.8%-8.3pp vs all communities
Spending on school education2025INR 9,249INR 12,941INR 12,616-3692
Household net worth2018INR 15.0 lakhINR 18.8 lakhINR 18.9 lakh-390000
Regular salaried share202318.0%21.9%21.7%-3.9pp vs Hindu
Cost of a hospital stay2025INR 30,104INR 34,323INR 34,064-4219
Toilet access202090.3%80.7%82.5%+9.6pp vs Hindu
Clean water at home201869.3%62.5%63.6%+6.8pp vs Hindu
Monthly spending2023INR 4,455INR 4,974INR 4,958-503
Labour-force participation202355.0%60.9%60.1%-5.9pp vs Hindu
Infant mortality rate202033.035.434.7-2.4
Literacy rate201168.6%73.3%73.0%-4.7pp vs Hindu
Institutional delivery rate202084.3%89.5%88.6%-5.2pp vs Hindu
Children stunted (under 5)202036.8%35.5%35.5%+1.3pp vs Hindu
Unemployment rate20233.2%3.1%3.2%+0.1pp vs Hindu
Anaemia in women (15-49)202055.6%57.4%57.0%-1.8pp vs Hindu
Sex ratio2011951939943+12
Pucca housing201883.6%83.3%83.3%+0.3pp vs Hindu
Population share201114.2%79.8%n/abaseline
Communal incidents (police)2023272 (national aggregate)NCRB tally; civic counts higher

"Gap" is the Muslim value minus the reference baseline (Hindu where available, otherwise all communities). Red means the Muslim outcome is worse than the reference; green means it is better. For justice metrics, cells show the absolute count alongside the incarceration rate per 100,000 people of that religion, and the gap is the Muslim-to-Hindu rate ratio (1.0× means parity; above 1.0× means Muslims are overrepresented).